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Abstract
The purpose o f this dissertation is to explore the motivation behind various 
restructuring choices within a securities issuance context. Previous theoretical models 
and empirical evidence suggest that three methods of restructuring - equity carve-outs, 
sell-offs, and spin-offs, on average, signal favorable information about parent firms. 
This has been interpreted as reflecting either enhanced potential for efficiency gains, 
positive asymmetric information about the value o f industry assets, or changes in 
agency costs. This dissertation presents an alternative framework by relating 
restructuring announcements to the effects o f security issuance. Empirical tests are 
formulated to determine if these announcements contain valuable private information 
about the value o f a subsidiary by analyzing whether or not elements of this 
information apply to other firms involved in related activities.
Rivals o f the carved-out subsidiaries experience negative revaluation effects. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that a motivation for equity carve-outs is 
management’s belief that a subsidiary is likely to be overvalued by the market.
Similar to equity carve-outs, the announcement of the intent to go public releases 
elements of industry-common information that causes downward revaluation o f intra­
industry rivals of the announcing firm. Rivals of spun-off subsidiaries increase in 
value around these announcements which suggests managers believe the subsidiary’s 
asset value is greater than the proceeds that equity carve-out or sell-off transactions 
would produce. Although sell-off announcements do not generate significant intra-
viii
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industry effects, there are significant positive share price reactions to rivals of firms 
undergoing general restructurings. This indicates that positive information is released 
by these announcements about the value o f the core assets o f the restructuring firm.
ix
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The existence of a market for transferring control o f corporate assets enhances 
general economic welfare by fostering the discipline to induce firms to combine 
resources into more efficient and/or profitable operations. In large part, the literature 
on the market for corporate control has focused on merger and acquisition activity. 
The results from many empirical studies on mergers and takeovers, summarized in 
Jensen and Ruback [1988], and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter [1988], indicate that 
these transactions create wealth, on average, for target firm shareholders which may 
or may not be shared by bidder’s shareholders. An equally important component o f 
the market for corporate control is corporate restructuring transactions. The decision 
to divest assets may reflect management’s desire to create more entrepreneurial, 
streamlined, decentralized, and efficient firms.
The literature on asset divestiture and corporate economic restructuring, while 
not as developed as the literature on mergers and acquisitions, is notable in finding 
consistent event study results for different types o f events. These studies indicate 
that, on average, voluntary restructuring decisions enhance shareholder wealth. In 
particular, Schipper and Smith [1986] document positive and significant returns of 
approximately two percent to announcement o f equity carve-outs. Schipper and Smith
[1983], Hite and Owers [1983], and Miles and Rosenfeld [1983] report that spin-offs 
announcements are associated with positive and significant returns of two to four
1
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percent. Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] find that announcing firms experience 
positive and significant returns o f approximately two percent around announcements 
o f asset sell-offs.
These studies on corporate asset disposition offer several hypotheses to explain 
the motivations behind, and the positive wealth gains from, corporate restructuring 
decisions which parallel hypotheses developed in the mergers and acquisitions 
literature. These hypotheses include: revelation o f managerial assessment o f asset 
value, improved managerial efficiency, synergies, reduction o f agency costs, 
avoidance o f regulatory and tax constraints, bondholder wealth expropriation, opening 
the firm to merger and acquisition bids, and enhancing the opportunity set for 
individual investors.
W hile these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, some appear to have 
stronger support from empirical results and therefore may be more applicable as 
explanations for restructuring decisions. The two dominant hypotheses are: 1) there 
are important elements o f private information conveyed by restructuring decisions 
about relevant assets (Schipper and Smith [1983,1986], and Hite, Owers and Rogers
[1987]) and 2) there are economic efficiency gains from restructuring (Schipper and 
Smith [1983,1986], Hite and Owers [1983], Miles and Rosenfeld [1983] and Hite, 
Owers and Rogers [1987]). The purpose o f this dissertation is to test the applicability 
o f these hypotheses as explanations for the motivation behind economic restructuring 
by viewing these different decisions within the broader context o f securities issuance 
phenomena. By analyzing the share price reaction to rivals o f the restructured unit
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and the parent firm, it is demonstrated that the market differentiates between the 
signal content o f the three alternative methods o f restructuring - equity carve-outs, 
sell-offs and spin-offs.
Detailed descriptions o f the characteristics o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and 
sell-offs are found in chapter 2. Characteristics unique to each o f these forms of 
restructuring suggest that different motivations may drive the selection o f the 
divestiture mechanism. For example, an equity carve-out and a sell-off both involve 
external capital acquisition, but the former is an equity issuance decision associated 
with public disclosure of information while the latter is a private transaction with little 
disclosure of proprietary information. A spin-off is associated with considerable 
information disclosure but does not involve the acquisition of external capital. 
Descriptions of voluntary liquidations and jo in t ventures are also given in this chapter 
to  provide additional perspective on carve-outs, spin-offs, and sell-offs.
The major hypotheses developed for each form o f corporate restructuring are 
discussed in chapter 3. The efficiency hypothesis, which states that gains related to 
the announcement o f an economic restructuring flow from moving resources from 
lower to higher valued uses, is addressed first. Gains can be achieved through 
economies of scale or scope, or by aligning managers’ incentives to more closely 
reflect those of shareholders by creating incentive contracts tied to market-based 
measures of the unit’s performance. The asymmetric information hypothesis stems 
from the Myers and M ajluf [1984] model o f securities issuance which is built on the 
assumption that managers make shareholder-wealth maximizing decisions based on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possession o f information not available in the public domain. Accordingly, the choice 
o f restructuring mechanism reveals this information and allows the market to revalue 
relevant assets.
The third explanation for gains associated with restructuring decisions is based 
on Jensen’s [1986] free cash flow argument, but is only applicable to restructuring 
activities that produce proceeds for the parent firm. In particular, retaining the 
proceeds from equity carve-outs and asset sales may exacerbate agency problems and 
lead to excessive consumption o f managerial perquisites. Therefore, unless the 
proceeds are used to repay creditors, repurchase equity, or pay dividends, 
restructuring decisions may result in suboptimal investment of corporate resources.
Because each hypothesis results in different predictions for industry valuation 
effects, announcement reactions to intra-industry rivals o f the relevant unit and the 
parent firm are used as a means o f testing these hypotheses. The previous literature 
on intra-industry rival share price reactions to various managerial decisions is also 
discussed in chapter 3.
In chapter 4, the literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) is reviewed.
W hile an IPO is not a form o f economic restructuring, this securities issuance decision 
can provide further perspective on equity carve-outs. IPOs are included in the study 
because they resemble equity carve-outs in several ways, most notably because both 
decisions create a newly traded public firm by issuing equity claims to the public. 
From this securities issuance perspective the predicted effects on intra-industry rivals 
should be the same for both IPOs and equity carve-outs. Therefore, intra-industry
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
effects o f IPO announcements aid in interpreting restructuring decisions within the 
context o f securities issuance phenomena.
Chapter 5 contains an explanation o f the methodology used in this dissertation 
and descriptive statistics o f the samples used in the analysis. The empirical results are 
reported in chapter 6. Taken together, the event study results support the argument 
that corporate restructuring decisions are intricately tied to the market’s assessment of 
private information possessed by managers. M oreover, the results imply that 
restructuring decisions convey elements o f information relevant to revaluing assets 
employed in similar activities. In several cases, industry reactions to these events 
contradict predictions stemming from the efficiency hypothesis in several important 
respects. Although the effects of agency problems may also be reflected in market 
reactions to divestiture announcements, if  such effects exist, they are dominated by 
information effects typical o f securities issuance phenomena. Chapter 7 contains the 
conclusions derived from this study o f corporate restructurings.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
Transferring Rights to Control Corporate Assets: Mechanisms o f Restructuring
1. In troduction
Mergers and acquisitions have long played an important role in firm 
development and expansion. M ore recently, going private transactions have also 
become an important means to transfer control o f corporate assets. The presence o f a 
market for transferring control o f corporate assets has important economic 
implications because it fosters the discipline to induce firms to combine resources into 
more efficient and/or profitable operations, thus enhancing general economic welfare. 
In general, friendly acquisitions and mergers are likely to be motivated by potential 
gains in operational or managerial efficiency linked to the existence o f differential 
management skills and specialization. Hostile takeovers can also focus on improving 
managerial efficiency, but are more likely to reflect the perception that incumbent 
management has failed to maximize firm value.
An extensive literature has documented that control transactions create overall 
economic gains and Jensen and Ruback [1983] and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter
[1988] provide surveys o f this literature. There is considerable evidence that the 
shareholders o f target firms experience significant wealth increases as a  result o f 
control transactions, but the evidence is ambiguous as to whether shareholders o f 
acquiring firms are, on average, better off. Excess returns to target firm shareholders 
may stem from the fact that bids are made by external agents that investigate the value
6
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o f firms and through this process supply capital markets, via merger negotiations or 
takeover bids, with new information pertinent to revaluing relevant securities. 
Economic gains reflected in these returns may come from combining corporate 
resources so as to seize economies o f scale (e.g. horizontal mergers/acquisitions) or 
scope in areas of management, operations and improved access to capital markets. 
Other theories that have been developed to explain the sources o f potential gains 
involve resolution of agency problems, creation of monopolistic power, and value 
enhancing tax strategies.
Voluntary corporate restructuring decisions are closely related to takeovers, 
mergers, and going private transactions because each o f these mechanisms is part of 
the general process of resource reallocation in the economy. The dynamic 
characteristics o f product and financial markets, manufacturing technologies, and 
competition sometimes require a firm to restructure its activities to meet the objective 
o f shareholder wealth maximization. Such voluntary economic restructuring decisions 
usually entail disposing o f a subsidiary or operating division and contrast with the 
decision to dispose of a single asset (such as a plant) or to undergo a financial 
restructuring in which a firm rebalances the proportion o f debt and equity in its capital 
structure.
Recent studies on corporate asset disposition have offered several hypotheses to 
explain the motivations for restructuring, most of which parallel hypotheses developed 
to explain mergers and acquisitions activity. Much o f the empirical analysis indicates 
that restructuring activities, on average, enhance shareholder value. Among the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hypotheses developed to explain these positive gains are: revelation o f managerial 
assessment o f asset value, improved managerial efficiency, synergies, reduction of 
agency costs, avoidance of regulatory and tax constraints, bondholder wealth 
expropriation, opening the firm to merger and acquisition bids, and spanning financial 
markets. It has also been argued that asset sales can cause negative valuation effects. 
For example, an asset sale may be interpreted as a signal of financial distress or may 
be used to defend against a takeover bid.
Two hypotheses, not necessarily mutually exclusive, that have dominated the 
restructuring literature are: 1) there are important elements o f private information held 
by managers about relevant assets that are conveyed by restructuring decisions 
(Schipper and Smith [1983,1986], and Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987]) and 2) there 
are economic efficiency gains from restructuring (Schipper and Smith [1983,1986], 
Hite and Owers [1983], Miles and Rosenfeld [1983] and Hite, Owers, and Rogers 
[1987]). Recently, agency cost arguments based on Jensen’s [1986] free cash flow 
hypothesis have also been developed by Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1993] as a 
framework for analyzing asset restructuring. Although similar hypotheses have 
evolved in the corporate control literature, there is little published work that integrates 
these areas o f research.
The specific types o f asset disposition examined in this dissertation are equity 
carve-outs, spin-offs, and sell-offs. Intra-industry share price responses to 
announcements of each of these forms o f restructuring are examined as a means to 
test the applicability o f the hypotheses being tested. M ore specifically, these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hypotheses render different predictions for rival share price responses for one or more 
o f these restructuring events. Therefore, announcement responses can be used to 
support or reject specific hypotheses that are being tested. To provide further 
perspective on the information effects o f equity carve-outs, which are a special type o f 
initial public offering o f equity (IPO), there is also an intra-industry analysis of the 
effects of announcements o f conventional IPOs.
Three alternative forms o f restructuring mechanisms are analyzed and 
compared because each has unique characteristics as a method of external financing in 
addition to its effects on the firm’s organizational and economic structure. Theories 
o f  security issuance and related empirical work reviewed in Smith [1986] suggest that 
the type o f security utilized, the market mechanism (public or private), the size o f the 
offering, and timing o f the offering may each convey valuable information to public 
markets. Each of these facets of a restructuring decision provides new information 
that allows investors to revalue relevant outstanding securities. For the issuing firm, 
share price responses to restructuring decisions may reflect changes in the market’s 
assessment o f  firm risk, current asset values, or perceived future cash flows. New 
information revealed in the announcement may also apply to firms whose operations 
are similar to the announcing firm or the unit involved in the restructuring. In 
particular, if  an action communicates private information about the value of relevant 
industry assets or cash flows, then its announcement will cause the revaluation o f 
outstanding securities o f firms engaged in similar economic activities. Thus, an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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analysis o f intra-industry effects of restructuring decisions provides a  means to test the 
validity o f theories that have been developed to explain economic restructuring.
Relevant financing decisions are intimately associated with economic 
restructuring and involve issues such as: the degree o f ownership to be retained in the 
asset in question, whether there is access to external capital, the use of private versus 
public transactions in capital raising, and the type o f security, if  any, that will be 
issued. I begin the analysis of these issues by discussing the nature o f the 
restructuring mechanisms available to managers.
2. M echanism s of restructu ring
General corporate restructurings usually arise from management’s desire to 
create more streamlined, specialized, decentralized, and/or entrepreneurial 
organizations. Recent literature has discussed several basic forces that can induce a 
firm to restructure. First, private information about future cash flows or current asset 
values of a division or other unit may induce management to separate a subsidiary 
from the remainder o f the parent firm. Second, improvements in managerial 
incentives to utilize assets more productively can be accomplished by linking 
compensation contracts of division managers to subsidiary (rather than parent firm) 
performance through a restructuring. Third, asset disposition may improve economic 
efficiency by transferring assets to new owners that have a  comparative advantage at 
managing them. Fourth, economic restructurings may help resolve agency problems. 
For example, if  parent firm managers have been overly optimistic about their ability
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to manage disparate businesses or the potential o f past acquisitions, a form of 
corporate aggrandizement as suggested by Roll’s [1986] hubris hypothesis, asset 
disposition can be a means to reverse the misguided growth. Conversely, Jensen’s 
[1986] free cash flow hypothesis implies that agency problems may be exacerbated if 
a restructuring decision entails an equity offering or asset sale because these 
transactions generate additional cash for the firm. Finally, a major factor in the 
decision to divide the firm may be the desire to circumvent tax and/or regulatory 
constraints.
Identification of a firm ’s comparative advantages allows management to focus
on areas related its expertise and to disengage the firm from activities that lack
strategic fit. Often, decisions about abandoning certain industries and increasing
investment in other industries coincide with management’s forecast o f an industry’s
profit potential that presumably reflects information known only to managers. Below
are several examples o f Wall Street Journal announcements o f corporate restructurings
that illustrate management’s desire to adopt more efficient and profitable
organizational structures. The first is an example of a restructuring announcement
that focuses on an "underperforming" division:
Mobil Corp. Feb 25. 1985: Mobil Corp’s decision to hire an investment 
adviser apparently means the big oil company is coming to grips with 
several disappointing non-oil investments, including its Montgomery 
Ward & Co. retailing unit. ... "We are not at all averse to removing 
those parts o f the business that are not earning adequate rates of 
return,"
Mobil C orp.’s management reached the decision that its non-oil investments 
were not providing a satisfactory rate of return on investment. Management’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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decision to dispose of the disappointing investments may indicate that this industry 
(retailing) is perceived by M obil’s managers as likely to be relatively unprofitable in 
the future. Another possible interpretation, however, is that M obil’s managers have 
no comparative advantage at managing assets in these industries. For example, the 
announcement specifically mentions Montgomery Ward & Co., a mass merchandiser, 
as an under-performing asset. Although M obil’s managers presumably have a 
comparative advantage in operating an integrated oil and gas company, the set of 
management, production, and marketing skills required by a mass merchandiser could 
be distinctly different from those required by an integrated oil firm. If  so, it may be 
difficult for M obil’s managers to assess the effectiveness o f the managers o f its 
retailing operations. Thus, it is rational for Mobil to divest itself of subsidiaries 
lacking strategic fit. This announcement indicates that Mobil also hired an investment 
advisor to provide counsel for the restructuring, which presumably includes guidance 
on the type o f restructuring mechanism to be adopted.
The announcement o f Freeport-McMoran’s restructuring provides another 
example o f a statement o f managerial expectations with respect to the profitability of 
its businesses:
Freeport-McMoran Nov 30. 1989: Freeport-M cM oran Inc. outlined a 
plan to withdraw from several business, selling $1.2 billion to $1.5 
billion o f assets, so that it can concentrate on developing two huge 
commodity discoveries. The natural-resources company said it sees 
greater profitability in its giant sulfur discovery in the Gulf o f Mexico 
off Louisiana and its sizable copper and gold find in Indonesia. "From 
1989 to 1993 we’ll be spending almost $1 billion to get these two things 
on stream," said James R. Moffett, chairman and chief executive 
officer.
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Freeport-M cM oran’s announcement indicates that its managers believe they
have a comparative advantage in producing sulfur, copper and gold. Pursuing this
advantage will increase the firm’s profitability. Unlike the Mobil announcement,
there is no indication that the assets to be sold are unprofitable or performing
unsatisfactorily. This announcement also differs from M obil’s because Freeport-
M cM oran’s managers explicitly state that they intend to "concentrate" on specific
industries by increasing investment in those activities and withdrawing from others.
In M obil’s case future investment intentions were less explicit, that is, they announced
withdrawal from peripheral, non-oil industries but did not specifically indicate where
the proceeds from the sale would be utilized.
Gulf & W estern’s restructuring announcement illustrates that inefficiencies can
arise because o f diseconomies of scale in management or the presence o f agency
problems in conglomerate firms:
Gulf & Western Industries. Inc. Aug. 15. 1983: "Gulf & Western 
Industries Inc. directors approved a massive divestiture plan... The 
divestiture plan, when complete, will leave G&W a leaner and less 
complex company than the conglomerate built by Charles G. Bluhdorn, 
its founder, who died in February. The new chief executive, Martin S.
Davis, said in an interview that the divestiture plan is the result o f his 
efforts to streamline G&W by getting rid of low-margin industrial 
businesses and focusing on three areas: consumer products, 
entertainment and financial services."
This "demerger" o f a conglomerate firm may be the result o f a new chief 
executive officer realizing that G&W does not have sufficient skills in areas outside of 
consumer products, entertainment, and financial services to compete profitably. It 
may also reflect a reduction in G&W management’s expectations about the
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profitability o f those peripheral industries. The demerger may also be the solution to 
an agency problem. If the founder engaged in corporate aggrandizement by 
overestimating his skills as a manager or the profitability o f businesses acquired 
outside o f G&W’s core operations, the announcement o f the divestiture of the non­
core assets will signal the reversal of these mistakes and the intention o f current 
managers to enhance shareholder wealth.
There are several alternative means to restructure a firm’s operation, including 
equity carve-outs, spin-off, sell-offs, voluntary liquidations, and joint ventures. Each 
mechanism has different impacts on the transfer o f private information, control o f the 
assets in question, and economic efficiency. The focus of this dissertation is on 
equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs, which are discussed in detail below. 
Liquidations, a piecemeal sale of the entire firm, and jo in t ventures, partnerships with 
other firms, are two other forms o f corporate restructuring that will be discussed 
briefly to provide perspective on the nature o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell- 
offs but no formal analysis of these two types o f events will be included in this 
dissertation.
Equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and sell-offs can each serve as methods of 
restructuring that achieve greater economic efficiency by moving resources to higher 
valued uses. However, from the perspective of external financing and securities 
issuance, there are key differences between these alternatives that can provide 
valuable insight into the factors that motivate managers to conduct each type of
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restructuring activity. Characteristics o f these restructuring methods are summarized 
in Table 1.
2 .1 . Equity  carve-outs
Equity carve-outs are initial public offerings (IPOs) o f equity in a firm ’s 
wholly-owned subsidiary. These offerings parallel seasoned stock or conventional 
initial public offerings since they generate cash for the parent firm through a public 
sale of residual claims to relevant assets. In particular, equity carve-outs create 
publicly traded equity that has a claim only on a division’s cash flows. This provides 
a means o f having these cash flows independently priced by the market. This type of 
equity sale generally involves a  firm commitment contract with an investment banker 
who agrees to purchase the equity and resell the claims to the public. The parent o f a 
carved-out subsidiary may retain either a controlling or a  minority interest in the 
carved-out subsidiary, but generally, the parent maintains a controlling interest so the 
subsidiary gains relatively little increased autonomy. As a result o f this relationship 
with the parent, the subsidiary is exposed to less financial risk than it would face as a 
"stand alone" entity.
Schipper and Smith [1986] report that parent firms announcing the intent to 
carve-out a subsidiary experience a positive and significant stock price reaction of 
approximately 2% on average. Thus, the market views an equity carve-out as a 
favorable event. This contrasts with the average stock price decline o f 3 % when a 
firm announces a seasoned equity offer. Parents maintained at least 50 percent
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Table 1
Characteristics o f  Restructuring Mechanisms




Cash inflow Yes No Yes
Security issued Equity None None
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control in 89 percent o f the cases, indicating that generally, a  carve-out cannot be 
viewed as a  change in control. Schipper and Smith also report that the proceeds from 
carve-outs range from $300,000 to over $112 million, which translates into 0.3 
percent to 69 percent o f parent equity value, with a  median value o f 8 percent. Thus, 
equity carve-outs are generally large equity issues. In 64 o f the 72 cases (89 percent) 
examined by Schipper and Smith, the parent firm retained over 50 percent of the 
equity o f the carved-out subsidiary. For the carved-out subsidiaries in their sample 
with available data, the average initial return on the offering day is 1.7 percent 
(excluding one outlier with an initial return o f 133 percent). This small degree o f 
average underpricing contrasts with that of conventional IPOs reported by Ritter
[1984] (26.5 percent) and Ibbotson [1975] (11.4 percent). This suggests that equity 
carve-outs are not characterized by the same degree o f asymmetric information as 
conventional IPOs even though both methods of issuing equity are subject to identical 
Securities and Exchanges Commission requirements.
The issuance of publicly traded equity in a carved-out subsidiary is governed 
by the Securities Act o f 1933 which requires issuers of securities to fully disclose all 
material information regarding a security, its backers, and its intended use to 
prospective investors prior to the sale o f the securities. Disclosure compliance is 
accomplished through filing a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). This statement contains two parts, the prospectus - a summary of 
the longer registration statement submitted to the SEC which is designed to help
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investors evaluate the security - and a second section (items-and-answers) containing 
detailed information addressing inquiries raised by the SEC.
In general, the registration statement is intended to provide prospective 
investors with the following information: the security issuer’s properties and 
businesses, significant provisions of the security to be offered for sale and their 
relationship to the offeror’s other securities, background information about 
management and the current status of the offeror, and financial statements certified by 
independent public accountants. Registration statements become effective on the 20th 
day after filing is complete. However, the SEC may advance or delay the effective 
date if  it deems such action to be in the interest o f investors and the public.
The SEC issued additional requirements for firms wishing to carve-out 
subsidiaries in 1985. To prevent profits from being overstated, subsidiaries must 
subtract all general, selling and administrative expenses from their own earnings to 
prevent "hiding" these expenses in the parent’s accounting statements. The SEC also 
requires that any goodwill created from the previous purchase o f a subsidiary to be 
carried on the subsidiary’s books. These accounting changes must be reflected in the 
prospectus before it is distributed.
Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) and Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcements 
o f equity carve-outs typically include information related to the number o f shares to 
be sold, the expected offer price range, the firm ’s investment banker, the ownership 
stake retained by the parent, the use of proceeds, and the primary activities o f the 
subsidiary.
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The following announcement o f the intent o f Banner Industries to carve out 
Banner Aerospace released over the DJNW is typical o f equity carve-out 
announcements:
Washington - Banner Aerospace Inc., a unit o f Banner Industries Inc., filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for an initial offering o f 9.5 
million common shares. After the offering, Banner Aerospace will have 18 
million shares outstanding. The sale o f the shares would reduce Banner 
Industries’ stake in Banner Aerospace to 47.2 pc from 100 pc. It is currently 
estimated that the initial price o f the stock will be in the range o f $16 to $18 
per share, the filing said. Salomon Brothers Inc. and M errill Lynch Capital 
Markets will underwrite the offering, (dated 05/16/90, time stamped 3:21 pm)
Below is the WSJ article reporting Banner Inds. In c .’s intent to carve out
Banner Aerospace which was published the subsequent day.
Cleveland - Banner Industries Inc. said it is considering an initial public 
offering o f common stock of its Banner Aerospace Inc. unit. Banner 
said it filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in connection with the proposed sale o f 9.5 million shares.
The company said it granted the underwriters an option to purchase an 
additional 1,425,000 shares to cover overallotments. Salomon Brothers 
Inc. and Merrill Lynch Capital markets, a unit o f M errill Lynch Co., 
are the underwriters. As a result o f the offering, Banner Industries’ 
beneficial ownership of the common stock o f Banner Aerospace will be 
reduced to 47.2% from 100% and to 39.3% if  the overallotment option 
is exercised in full. Banner said completion o f the offering is subject to 
market conditions. In March, Banner said it was considering shedding 
nonmanufacturing business, including its waste water treatment group 
and its aerospace distribution group. Lately, the company has been 
trying to raise capital for acquisitions more closely related to its 
manufacturing focus. Banner Aerospace distributes new and overhauled 
aviation replacement parts, including fasteners, avionics, bearings and 
electrical and airframe parts.
Schipper and Smith [1986] view an equity carve-out as a hybrid transaction 
that shares characteristics with both a seasoned equity issue and a spin-off. Equity 
carve-outs resemble seasoned equity offers because each is a form o f external
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financing that entails an equity issue, although the share price reaction is dramatically 
different. Carve-outs are compared to spin-offs because both of these transactions 
provide the firm with an opportunity to revise compensation contracts for subsidiary 
management to better align these managers’ incentives with those o f the relevant 
shareholders. For example, stock options can be linked to subsidiary stock prices and 
profitability measures, rather than to those of the parent, to directly reward subsidiary 
managers for effort and performance related to the subsidiary. In addition, both 
carve-outs and spin-offs are associated with the initiation o f public trading o f equity 
claims on subsidiary assets and a permanent increase in public disclosure of subsidiary 
information. Thus, the new public entities become subject to increased information 
collection and monitoring by outside investors, and monitoring by public markets, 
analysts and rating agencies.
This study develops a third comparison by viewing carve-outs as closely 
related to IPOs. Generally, both equity carve-outs and IPOs are associated with 
severe asymmetric information problems due to the lack o f publicly available 
information and history o f the relevant unit. Like IPOs, managers intending to issue 
equity claims on a wholly-owned subsidiary determine the amount o f equity to be 
issued and the time o f the public sale. Thus, the market for equity carve-outs and 
IPOs may suffer from problems related to adverse selection and moral hazard. The 
extensive IPO literature will be used later in this dissertation to draw further parallels 
between motivations for equity carve-outs and motivations for IPOs.
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2.2. Spin-offs
Spin-offs are initiated via a pro rata stock dividend (usually tax-free) to 
existing shareholders. This method o f corporate restructuring involves neither 
external financing nor third party agents. Instead, the consolidated firm is divided by 
managerial decision, subject to shareholder approval, into two (or more) firms with an 
identical set o f shareholders. Unlike an equity carve-out or an asset sell-off, a spin­
o ff reduces the asset base of the parent firm. Similar to a  sell-off, but unlike a carve- 
out, the parent cedes the right to manage the assets of the spun-off subsidiary. 
Nevertheless, spin-offs involve considerable managerial continuity because the assets 
will be managed solely by the division’s current management team, independent of 
parent firm management. Unlike a carve-out, the "stand alone" entity created by a 
spin-off is free from the parent’s control and completely separated from the parent’s 
resources. Nevertheless, even though the subsidiary is administratively and 
financially independent, the parent and subsidiary may maintain business relations 
(e.g. supplier and customer) if  their respective activities are related.
Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and Owers [1983] and Miles and Rosenfeld 
[1983] report positive and significant stock price reactions of 2% to 4% for firms 
announcing an intent to spin-off a subsidiary(s). Schipper and Smith indicate that the 
parent and the spun-off subsidiary belong to different industry classifications over 77 
percent o f the time. Hite and Owers indicate that the average value o f  spin-offs in 
their sample is 6.6 percent of the original equity value of the consolidated firm.
Miles and Rosenfeld report that the announcement stock price reaction in their sample
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is a positive function o f the size o f the spin-off. These authors interpret positive stock 
price reactions as being consistent with two explanations (aside from regulatory 
considerations). First, gains may arise from increased managerial efficiency o f the 
subsidiary’s assets. The efficiency increase may be achieved via improvement of the 
subsidiary managers’ incentive contracts by tying managerial compensation to the 
performance of the subsidiary or by eliminating negative synergies that may occur 
within a firm with diverse operating units. Second, the announcement gains may be 
associated with a permanent increase o f information flows about the subsidiary to, and 
enhanced monitoring by, public markets and related external monitors. Following the 
spin-off, the new publicly traded firm ’s performance is reported via its own set o f 
financial statements rather than being submerged in the parent’s performance in 
consolidated financial statements.
As with an equity carve-out, creation o f new, publicly traded claims via a  spin­
off requires extensive public disclosure. Prior to 1969, spin-offs were not regulated 
because the SEC considered them to be dividends, not security sales. Therefore, 
spin-offs were not deemed to be subject to the registration requirements established in 
the Securities Act of 1933. However, allegations that spin-offs were used to avoid 
disclosure requirements for "going public" transactions resulted in the SEC’s creating 
new filing requirements in 1969 and 1970 (Releases 4982 and 8909 respectively). 
Thus, since that time, the SEC has viewed spin-offs as a type o f security issuance 
even though there is no sale of securities.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
Currently, the SEC requires the following actions prior to the distribution of 
equity in a new firm that is be created through a spin-off. First, an agreement 
between the parent and subsidiary regarding the details o f the spin-off must be 
established. This is known as the plan o f reorganization and contains details o f the 
mechanics o f the spin-off. Included in this plan are: the relationship o f the parent and 
subsidiary during the period prior to and subsequent to the spin-off, asset/liability 
exchanges, the number o f shares o f stock to be distributed, record and payment dates 
for distribution, whether the new stock is to be listed on an exchange, and revisions of 
stock options, employee stock ownership plans and pensions plans. Second, a proxy 
statement must accompany the notice for the shareholders meeting at which the 
reorganization plan will be approved. Finally, a registration statement is submitted to 
the SEC with an accompanying prospectus. M ost o f the items in the proxy statement 
are also contained in the registration statement. The prospectus must be distributed to 
all shareholders receiving stock in the spin-off.
Under Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, the pro rata distribution o f 
the equity in the subsidiary is tax-free if  the following five criteria are met. One, the 
purpose of the spin-off must be germane to the corporations’ business activities (e.g., 
to separate a  business to allow its employees to participate in profit sharing). Two, 
the parent and the subsidiary must be engaged in business for at least five years 
preceding the spin-off. Three, the parent must own at least 80 percent o f the 
subsidiary stock and distribute all o f its holdings in the subsidiary to shareholders. 
Four, no pre-arranged plan for shareholders to sell the subsidiary stock subsequent to
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the spin-off may exist (continuity o f interest). Five, the transaction cannot be used 
primarily as a device for distributing the earnings or profits o f either the parent or 
subsidiary.
Typically, DJNW announcements of planned spin-offs include information
related to the pro rata distribution o f shares, the tax treatment o f the restructuring and
the operation(s) that will separated from the parent. Occasionally, additional
information is provided including the reason for the spin-off (e.g. the market will be
able to value the separate entities more precisely), past earnings information, recent
stock price movements, and cursory industry analysis. Below is an example o f a
DJNW spin-off announcement:
Acton Mass - Acton Corp. said its board approved a plan to spin off 
the company’s food operations into Acton Food Corp. at the end of the 
year. Acton Corp will continue to run its communications operations.
Acton Corp said one common share of Acton Food will be issued for 
each share o f Acton Corp.. Acton Corp said one Acton Food Corp. 
warrant will be issued for each Acton Corp. warrant, (dated 09/22/81, 
time stamped 10:24 am)
The WSJ article following the DJNW announcement generally contains similar
information, but in more detail. For example, the following WSJ article for the
Acton Corp. spin-off was published the subsequent day:
Acton Mass - Acton Corp. said its board approved a plan to spin off 
the company’s food operations into a separate company at year-end.
Acton Corp. which previously had disclosed its intentions to make the 
spinoff, will continue to operate its communications business, which 
includes 45 cable television systems, a telephone interconnect company, 
a telephone equipment manufacturing company and a broadcast 
division. The company said one share o f stock in the new concern will 
be issued for each share o f Acton Corp. held. For each Acton Corp. 
warrant held, a warrant in the new company will be issued, the
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company added. The new food company will include a snack food
manufacturing group, a service group and a egg farm.
This announcement o f Acton Corporation’s spin-off illustrates the diverse 
business activities currently under its management. The announcement indicates that 
the firm is to be split into two broad economic activities: broadcasting and 
communications, and food production and distribution. In this case, the motivation 
for the restructuring is not given. Incentives to separate Acton Corp’s assets may be 
the result of diseconomies in managing disparate business activities. Because a spin­
o ff is accompanied by increased disclosure o f information about the subsidiary, 
managers may be attempting to capture unrecognized value for current shareholders 
by informing financial markets o f the perceived higher value o f the firms assets 
without changing the residual claims on the assets.
2.3. Asset sell-offs
Asset sell-offs include the sale of product lines, divisions, and subsidiaries to 
third parties through negotiated contracts. Unlike equity carve-outs and spin-offs, the 
typical sell-off does not create a new entity because the seller and buyer are usually 
existing, operating firms. However, some sell-offs involve leveraged purchases o f a 
division by its management (management buyout) and/or other private investors 
(leveraged buyouts). Asset sales generate cash inflows to the parent firm and thus can 
be viewed as a form of external financing as well as a mechanism for transferring the 
right to manage assets from the seller’s management team to the buyer’s. The buyer
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determines whether to retain the division’s current managers or to replace them with a 
new team o f managers.
Sell-offs, unlike spin-offs, do not intrinsically decrease a firm ’s asset base; 
instead, they transform part o f the firm’s illiquid assets into liquid assets that can be 
used to purchase other operating assets, reduce debt, or to disburse funds to 
shareholders through share repurchases or special dividends. Typically sell-offs are 
privately negotiated and, much like bank loans or other privately placed securities, 
involve little information disclosure relative to the issuance o f publicly traded 
securities. Investment bankers are usually employed to facilitate the sell-off 
transaction and maintain confidentiality, through biparty negotiations or a  private 
auction. On rare occasions the asset will be sold through a public auction. As in the 
case o f acquisitions of publicly traded companies, buyers generally expend 
considerable resources to determine the value of the asset in question before agreeing 
to purchase it. Unlike the purchase of an entire firm, however, no market price o f a 
subsidiary is available to reflect the market’s prior assessment of its value.
Typically, a successful (i.e ., ultimately completed) sell-off indicates that the 
bidder is willing to pay an amount at least as great as the seller’s assessment of the 
asset’s value. This suggests the buyer has some favorable information regarding the 
asset’s value not known to the seller or the market. Recent empirical studies by 
Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer [1984], Jain [1985] and Hite, Owers, and Rogers
[1987] indicate that sell-off announcements are associated with positive and significant 
average stock price reactions of 1 %-2 % for shareholders of the selling firms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
Positive share price reactions to selling firms from announcements o f sell-offs are 
interpreted as evidence that these transactions are associated with the movement of 
assets to higher valued uses.
The SEC requires corporations to report any material events or corporate 
changes that are o f importance to investors or security holders that have not been 
previously reported. This is accomplished by filing a Form 8-K. Frequently, a sell- 
o ff will induce firms to comply with this requirement and submit a Form 8-K. In the 
case o f an exchange o f a material asset, the SEC requires that firms (sellers and 
purchasers) disclose: 1) the date of the sale and a brief description o f the assets 
involved, 2) the nature and amount o f consideration given or received for the assets,
3) identity of other parties involved in the transaction, 4) the nature o f any material 
relationship between transaction participants. The acquirer must meet two additional 
requirements: 1) identify the source o f funds used, excluding ordinary bank loans if 
confidentiality criteria have been met, and 2) state the nature o f the business in which 
the assets were employed and declare whether or not the assets will be used for the 
same purposes. If  new uses are intended, they should be reported.
For most sell-offs, only general characteristics o f the transaction are released 
to the public such as: which assets are being sold, the name o f the buyer, the 
transaction price, and the method of payment. A sell-off announcement may also 
contain information related to the seller’s (buyer’s) motivation for disposing of 
(purchasing) the assets, the seller’s and/or the subsidiary’s latest earnings and sales,
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and some analysis on the related industries. The following example is typical o f sell-
off announcements found in the Wall Street Journal:
New York - NL industries Inc. said it will purchase Sun C o.’s, oil field 
services subsidiary, Sperry-Sun Inc., for $252.3 million. Sperry-Sun, 
which supplies drilling products and services for the oil and gas 
industry, had sales o f about $100 million and profit o f more than $10 
million in 1980. Sales and earnings increased at a compound annual 
rate of over 30%. Sperry-Sun has plants in Sugarland, Texas;
Lafayette, La., and Cheltenham, England. NL is a major petroleum 
services, chemicals and metals company. Annual sales at N L’s 
petroleum services division are about $1.2 billion, and its purchase o f 
Sperry-Sun "underscores N L’s commitment" to oil services, said Ray 
C. Adam, chairman o f NL. Sperry-Sun marks N L’s entry into the 
"directional drilling market" he said. Sun’s chairman and president,
Theodore A Burtis, said Sperry-Sun is " more compatible with NL 
future interests." "There is a concern that "an oil field services 
company is less attractive to its customers - oil companies - when it is 
owned by another oil company," Mr. Burtis added. Sun is based in 
Radnor, Pa..
This announcement indicates that the seller, Sun Co., is disposing o f  its oil 
field services assets because it believes that it no longer possesses a comparative 
advantage in that industry. Thus, although Sperry-Sun is still profitable, the nature of 
its parent’s operations prevent it from reaching its perceived potential. Disposing of 
Sperry-Sun will presumably allow Sun Co. to become a more focused competitor in 
the refining and distribution sectors o f  the oil industry. Sperry-Sun is being purchased 
by NL Industries which has expressed a commitment to maintaining the 
competitiveness of its petroleum services division. NL Industries’ anticipated gains 
from this transaction may result from economies o f scale or scope. Implicitly, NL 
Industries’ decision to enter the directional drilling market through the purchase of
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Sperry-Sun indicates that management believes it is less expensive for them to acquire 
an existing company than to develop the business with their existing assets.
2.4. Voluntary liquidations
Voluntary liquidations are an extreme form o f asset sell-off. Rather than 
selling an individual piece o f the firm, managers sell all o f the pieces in multiple 
transactions and distribute the proceeds to shareholders through special dividends.
This form o f corporate restructuring indicates that the organizational capital of the 
firm has dissipated and is less a form o f restructuring than an auction o f the entire 
firm in piecemeal form. This method o f asset disposition is in contrast to a control 
transaction in which the entire firm is sold intact. Empirical analyses by Hite, Owers, 
and Rogers [1987] and Skantz and Marchesini [1987,1988] indicate that 
announcements o f voluntary liquidations are associated with a 12 percent to 14 percent 
increase in share price. Hite, Owers, and Rogers and Kim and Schatzberg report 
relatively small median market values of equity of $41 million and $23 million 
respectively for their samples of liquidations. Strongly positive and significant stock 
price reactions to announcements o f liquidation are documented by Hite, Owers, and 
Rogers, who find average two-day announcement returns o f 12.24%, and Kim and 
Schatzberg who report a three-day announcement return o f 14%. Skantz and 
Marchesini report an announcement month return of 21.4% .
A primary source of the positive announcement gains may be the anticipation 
o f an auction with multiple bidders. Another possible source o f gains is favorable tax
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treatment of any capital gains. Voluntary liquidations, unlike liquidations that occur 
as part of bankruptcy proceedings, have the positive motivation that managers feel that 
the firm is more valuable to shareholders by being dismantled and auctioned o ff than 
it is as an on-going concern. In addition, a  voluntary liquidation gives managers 
considerable control over the process by which the firm ’s assets are to be sold so as to 
enhance shareholder value. In contrast, in a bankruptcy liquidation, the court 
appoints a trustee who is responsible for terminating the firm ’s operations and 
disposing of the firm ’s assets.
2.5. Joint ventures
A joint venture is a complex form o f corporate restructuring that involves a 
continuing relationship with another firm. Creation o f a new legal entity via a joint 
venture may be viewed as a partial merger, while the sale of a  share o f an existing 
joint venture may be viewed as a divestiture. In either case, the partners exist as 
separate firms apart from the joint venture. Joint ventures may exist as partnerships, 
corporations, or any of several other legal forms of organization. Joint ventures are 
typically of limited scope and duration. Each partner contributes something to the 
venture that enhances the other participants’ investment, but, the sharing o f 
information and/or assets between participants is limited to the scope o f the joint 
venture. McConnell and Nantell [1985] show that on average, there are positive and 
significant share price reactions of approximately 0.73% for firms participating in 
joint ventures.
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There exists a wide range of motives for joint ventures. For example, a firm 
with a product idea whose outcome is highly uncertain and whose expected payoff 
may not be realized for several years may seek a  partner with sufficient cash flow to 
invest in development o f the idea. Frequently, transfer o f knowledge is a major 
factor in creating jo in t ventures. This is often the case when the knowledge to be 
shared is very complex or technical in nature. A jo int venture can also serve as a 
method o f reducing cash outlays and sharing risk in developing new technologies and 
markets. Creation o f  a new entity via a joint venture can also be means o f avoiding 
legal liability while developing new products. Finally, antitrust authorities may be 
more willing to permit joint ventures rather than mergers because a joint venture 
increases the number o f firms in an industry while a merger may reduce the number 
of firms.
3. Summary
General economic welfare is enhanced by the existence o f a market for 
corporate control that creates the discipline to induce managers to combine corporate 
resources into more profitable organizations. An extensive literature documents that 
gains are created from merger and acquisition activity. Substantial evidence indicates 
that, on average, shareholders o f target firms experience significant wealth increases, 
although the evidence on gains to shareholders o f acquiring firms is more ambiguous. 
There also exists considerable evidence that the dismantling o f complex corporate 
organizations enhances shareholder wealth.
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Announcements o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and asset sell-offs are each 
associated with positive stock price reactions, even though each differs as a  form of 
external financing and securities issuance and has a unique impact on the control of 
the assets in question. An equity carve-out is the sale to outside investors o f residual 
claims on a subsidiary’s assets that typically remain under the control of the parent.
A spin-off creates a new publicly traded entity that is administratively and financially 
independent o f its parent, via a pro rata dividend to existing shareholders without any 
new external financing. Like an equity carve-out, but unlike a spin-off, a sell-off is a 
form o f external financing. Unlike a spin-off, no stand alone entity is created because 
control of the division or subsidiary is generally transferred from one management 
team to the management team o f an existing, operating firm via a private transaction.
The focus of this dissertation is to test the relevance of motives associated with 
various types o f corporate restructuring by viewing these transactions within the 
context o f the securities issuance literature and related work on financing decisions. 
Intra-industry share price effects o f restructuring decisions, viewed within the 
framework o f models of securities issuance, will provide a means for testing the 
relevance o f three hypotheses that have been developed to explain management’s 
decision to restructure: the asymmetric information hypothesis, the efficiency 
hypothesis, and agency cost arguments.
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Chapter 3 
M ajor Hypotheses for Restructuring
1. Introduction
Previous literature on economic reorganization contains several alternative 
theories as explanations for the motivation behind corporate restructuring and asset 
disposition. Several o f  these alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and it 
is difficult to discriminate among them based on existing empirical evidence, which 
focuses predominately on share price reactions to announcing firms. In general 
previous empirical studies indicate that each form of restructuring (equity carve-out, 
spin-off, and asset sell-off) is, on average, a wealth enhancing event.
Schipper and Smith [1986] posit that the positive returns from equity carve- 
outs may result from: (1) increased disclosure o f information related to the 
subsidiary’s activities and profitability, (2) improved efficiency in asset management 
that is the result of changes in management compensation contracts, and (3) 
preventing subsidiary management from having to forego positive net present value 
projects by separating the parent’s and the subsidiary’s external financing 
opportunities. This argument is based on predictions stemming from Myers and 
M ajluf’s [1984] model of security issuance (that will be discussed in detail later) 
which argues that managers may forego positive net present value projects to avoid 
the negative information effects associated with seasoned equity issues (if no 
alternative funding source is available). Schipper and Smith conclude that each of
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
these explanations may account for the 2% increase in parent firm shareholder value 
that is observed in response to equity carve-out announcements.
Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and Owers [1983], and Miles and Rosenfeld 
[1983] hypothesize that the positive returns to spin-offs may be explained by: (1) a 
permanent increase in information disclosure about the subsidiary and the parent, (2) 
elimination o f diminishing returns to management through increased specialization by 
the parent and the spun-off subsidiary that enhances shareholder value, (3) resolution 
o f agency problems, (4) overcoming regulatory, tax, and bond covenant constraints, 
(5) bondholder wealth expropriation and (6) facilitating opportunities for takeover 
bids.
Of these theories, only the bondholder wealth expropriation hypothesis is 
inconsistent with existing empirical evidence. In particular, Schipper and Smith and 
Hite and Owers demonstrate that neither bond prices nor bond ratings show 
statistically significant reactions to announcements o f spin-offs. Due to the small 
number o f parent firms that spin off subsidiaries because of regulatory considerations 
and the even smaller number o f cases in which a spin-off leads to a takeover of either 
the parent or the subsidiary, it is difficult to generate definitive evidence about these 
considerations as explanations for the positive share price reaction to spin-off 
announcements. In particular, they are unlikely to be important motivations for 
restructuring via a spin-off in general, although they may be reasonable explanations 
for some specific restructurings.
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Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] argue that efficiency considerations are the 
major source o f positive returns to firms announcing sell-offs. They reach this 
conclusion because their results show that only firms that are able to complete an 
announced asset sale experience a permanent positive share price revision. For firms 
announcing a sell-off that is not brought to completion, the positive announcement 
effects eventually dissipate. This is consistent with the fact that efficiency gains are 
only realized when buyers with higher valued economic uses for the assets are able to 
purchase them from sellers with relatively lower valued economic uses. Hite, Owers 
and Rogers conclude that dissipation of the announcement reaction for firms not 
completing a sell-off is inconsistent with the hypothesis that information effects are the 
source o f the announcement gains.
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] find positive returns only for firms that pay 
out proceeds from asset sales to bondholders (they found no examples o f payouts to 
shareholders). Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz argue that sell-offs may potentially 
exacerbate agency problems if  there is retention of large free cash flows within the 
firm. They find that there are statistically insignificant returns to sellers who retain 
the proceeds within the firm, a result that they argue is inconsistent with efficiency 
arguments advanced by Hite, Owers, and Rogers.
This dissertation considers the three hypotheses that have become the dominant 
alternative explanations for restructuring activities: (1) the economic efficiency 
hypothesis, (2) the asymmetric information hypothesis, and (3) the agency cost 
hypothesis. Analysis o f intra-industry valuation effects, found in the finance and
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accounting literatures and discussed later, will be used to test the applicability o f the 
three hypotheses as explanations o f the various forms of corporate restructuring. 
Announcement returns o f intra-industry rivals aid in testing the validity o f the 
hypotheses because the predicted reaction for industry rivals is different for each 
hypothesis. These predictions are discussed in detail below.
2. The efficiency hypothesis
The gains from corporate restructuring decisions are often attributed to 
capturing potential efficiency gains obtained by moving assets to higher valued uses. 
The efficiency hypothesis is based on the assumption that there are differential 
managerial skills and comparative advantages of different corporate entities or that 
there are important economies o f scale and scope. This hypothesis predicts both 
private and social gains when assets are moved to higher valued uses. Economic 
gains from restructuring may arise if  current managers are induced to operate the 
assets in question more efficiently. Schipper and Smith [1983,1986] argue that 
efficiency gains may be achieved by dividing the firm for two separate, but related 
reasons. First, there may be diseconomies o f scale in management which dissipate 
economic gains that would otherwise be obtainable through separation o f disparate 
productive activities. For example, diversity o f transactions due to dissimilar 
activities of the parent and subsidiary may give rise to diseconomies. The costs o f 
decision making, which involve distributing investment-facilitating information, may 
also offset any economies o f scale or scope in production as firm complexity grows.
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The second potential cause o f diseconomies in management given by Schipper 
and Smith is the cost o f evaluating and rewarding managerial performance. Enhanced 
asset management may be achieved by reorganizing management’s responsibilities and 
incentives. Creating a "stand alone" entity through a corporate restructuring may be 
useful in promoting top level managers, attracting new, competent managers, and 
strengthening managerial incentives. For example, promoting a productive top level 
manager from within the parent firm to the post of Chief Executive Officer o f a newly 
created "stand alone" firm may be a form o f compensation that encourages continued 
profitable decision making and effort. The new Chief Executive Officer post may 
also be used to attract talented managers outside of the parent firm and thus augment 
or strengthen the management o f the assets o f  the new entity. Asset management 
efficiency can also be improved by incorporating subsidiary share prices as a market 
based measure o f their performance in incentive contracts rather than the use o f parent 
firm prices or profits or subsidiary accounting data. Subsidiary management can then 
be rewarded with stock options or other forms of compensation based more directly 
on their decisions and effort, rather than the performance o f the parent as a whole.
In their studies o f equity carve-outs and spin-offs, Schipper and Smith report 
that subsidiary managers are frequently offered new compensation contracts 
subsequent to the event. Almost without exception these contracts include stock 
options based on the subsidiary’s stock price and performance. Thus, a corporate 
restructuring decision that results in a new publicly traded entity may be an important 
method o f improving the management of subsidiary assets. In contrast, stimulating
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productive gains through the revision o f compensation contracts based on market 
prices is not possible in the case o f a  sell-off because no new publicly traded firm 
results from such a restructuring.
Another means to achieve improved operational efficiency is to transfer the 
right to control the assets to a new management team that is able to employ the assets 
more profitably. The comparative advantage possessed by the new managers may 
stem from potential economies of scale or scope in their current asset organization or 
may be due to the fact that the new managers are more competent in managing those 
assets.
Economies of scale occur because of the indivisibility of certain assets - 
people, equipment, and overhead. This encourages horizontal asset transfers, that is, 
asset transfer within an industry. Spreading the cost of the indivisible assets over a 
larger number o f units of output increases the returns to those assets. Therefore, if 
economies o f scale exist within an industry, asset utilization will be improved by 
moving resources from industry members who are operating at lower levels o f output 
to members who can more readily capture the gains from economies o f scale.
Economies of scope may arise due to the difficulty in writing, executing, and 
policing contracts, and are conducive to vertical integration. Combining assets related 
by a common productive activity, but employed at different stages o f the process, may 
reduce the cost o f the process. Costs of communication, bargaining, advertising, 
transportation, payment collections, and production coordination may be reduced if  a 
process is controlled by a single management team rather than competing management
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teams. The uncertainty over input supply may also be reduced through backward 
integration while distribution quality can be controlled by forward integration. In 
sum, reconciliation o f divergent interests o f parties to a contract is achieved through 
common ownership, which decreases costs related to contracting.
Because economies o f scale and scope are only obtainable by combining assets, 
a sell-off is the only form o f restructuring that can directly create efficiency gains in 
this manner. Both equity carve-outs and spin-offs produce stand alone entities that are 
not combined with the assets o f other firms. O f course it is possible that subsequent 
to a spin-off, the new firm may be taken over by a firm that has the potential to 
realize economies to scale or scope by combining the assets o f the carved-out or spun- 
off subsidiary with its own operations. If the market anticipates such a takeover, then 
these economies would be capitalized at the initial spin-off announcement.
A firm may lose its comparative advantage in an industry due to a material 
change in product markets, manufacturing technologies, or competition. As a result, 
a division or subsidiary may no longer be an efficient component of the firm ’s 
operations and therefore it is rational for managers to sell it to outsiders who have a 
comparative advantage in managing those assets and can achieve productive gains 
from its acquisition.
2.1. Intra-industry effects
Increasing the efficiency o f asset utilization creates social gains through 
enhanced allocation of resources. There are private gains to the owners o f the
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resources if  rents accrue from improving the competitive position o f the firm  within 
an industry. Such gains accrue to more competitive firms presumably at the expense 
o f the less competitive intra-industry rivals. For example, the increase in profitability 
may come as a result o f achieving low-cost producer status in a competitive market or 
by creating a monopolistic position within the industry through horizontal asset 
purchases. Either scenario indicates that the intra-industry rivals will face tougher 
competition and presumably lose future cash flows. Thus, gains to the firms involved 
in the restructuring come at the expense o f competitors. Therefore, the efficiency 
hypothesis implies that restructuring decisions should have a negative impact on rival 
firms unless the industry is perfectly competitive.
Potentially offsetting the gains related to increased efficiency is the fact that 
restructuring decisions may sometimes have the effect o f decreasing the number of 
independent producers o f a product. As the number o f firms within an industry 
decreases, the opportunity to collude increases and may result in an oligopoly. 
Therefore, there may also be intra-industry effects attributable to increases in market 
power through enhanced opportunities for collusion as well as improved efficiency 
effects. If  collusive activity is expected to be fostered by a consolidation o f 
operations, share prices o f rival firms should be revalued upward to reflect the 
expected increase in profits.
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3. The asymmetric information hypothesis
The asymmetric information hypothesis posits that managers (insiders) have 
valuable information about the value o f firm assets and future cash flows and reveal 
this private information (favorable or unfavorable) by the nature o f the corporate 
decisions they publicly announce. Arguments based on asymmetric information are 
usually developed within the context of signalling models, first developed by Spence 
[1973, 1974] in the labor economics literature and later introduced to finance by Ross 
[1977].
Ross’s model o f capital structure implies that changes in financial leverage 
convey information to financial markets about manager’s expectations of the firm ’s 
future profitability. For example, an increase in leverage may indicate that managers 
perceive future cash flows as being sufficiently high to safely bond themselves to 
higher future interest payments related to the increased indebtedness. A decrease in 
leverage may have an opposite interpretation, that is, managers may feel future cash 
flows will be insufficient to cover future interest obligations and therefore reduce 
those obligations to more appropriate levels, thus diminishing the probability of 
financial distress. Similar arguments have been developed in dividend models by 
Bhattacharya [1979], Hakansson [1982], and M iller and Rock [1985], These models 
interpret an increase in dividend payout by a firm as a signal that the firm has 
expected future cash flows sufficiently large to meet debt payments, dividend 
payments, and investment needs without increasing the probability o f bankruptcy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
The typical positive and significant stock price reaction to the announcement of 
an initiation or increase in dividends (Aharony and Swary [1980], Asquith and 
Mullins [1983,1986], and Healy and Palepu [1988]) or a firm repurchasing its own 
equity (Masulis [1980], Dann [1981] and Vermaelen [1981]) is interpreted as support 
for the argument that the market perceives dividend initiations and increases and share 
repurchases as signals o f favorable information regarding the firm ’s future prospects.
3.1. Asymmetric information and takeover bids
The asymmetric information hypothesis also extends to bidders in takeover 
transactions. Given imperfect information about potential future cash flows, share 
prices may not reflect the value o f assets that have more profitable alternative uses to 
potential buyers. Thus, a well-informed bidder may be prepared to pay a higher price 
for assets than the price at which the current owner and the market values those 
assets. Dodd and Ruback [1977] and Bradley [1980] assert that signalling is an 
important component in the valuation effects o f tender offers. They argue that a 
permanent upward revaluation o f target equity value, even when a tender offer is 
unsuccessful, indicates that the bid conveys private information to financial markets 
about the value of the target’s assets employed in alternative uses.
However, in subsequent studies Bradley, Desai, and Kim [1983,1988] observe 
that a permanent revaluation of target firms only occurs when the target’s assets are 
combined with those of another firm, whether it be the initial bidder or an ensuing 
bidder. They find that the upward revision in firm value o f the targets that do not
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receive subsequent bids dissipates shortly after the failed takeover attempt. Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim interpret these results as consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, that 
is, gains are only permanent if  assets are combined to create economies of scale.
They conclude that a tender offer does not necessarily imply that the target firm ’s 
assets are undervalued. Similarly, Hite, Owers, and Roger [1987] demonstrate that, 
consistent with the findings for tender offers, terminated sell-off negotiations result in 
the loss o f the positive announcement returns if  the failed attempt is not followed by 
another, eventually successful, negotiation. Thus, the evidence suggests that outside 
bidders involved in takeover and sell-off transactions do not necessarily convey 
private information about the value o f the assets being sought.
The hypothesis that takeover bids convey private information about target 
assets is also found in the literature on going private transactions. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Rice [1984], Lehn and Poulsen [1988], and Hite and Vetsuypens
[1988] find large premiums and abnormal announcement returns to shareholders in 
response to going private bids. The large premiums paid by the acquirers who are 
managers or other private investors rather than operating firms, are consistent with the 
argument that these agents have access to private information that leads them to place 
a higher value on the assets than the market does. The premium may reflect the 
acquirer’s expectations o f higher cash flows or that the acquirer views the firm ’s cash 
flows to be less risky than the market perceives.
Similar to attempts to take control o f a firm or take it private, a sell-off 
transaction unlike a carve-out or spin-off, involves an outside bidder(s) with private
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information seeking to gain control o f the division. Hite and Vetsuypens [1988] find 
small but significant wealth gains to parents completing divisional management 
buyouts, which is also consistent with the empirical results associated with going 
private transactions. Since no consolidation o f operating firms occurs in these cases, 
this evidence suggests that going private transactions, involving the entire firm or only 
portions of it, convey favorable information about the value o f relevant assets that is 
not available in public markets.
3.2. Asymmetric information and securities issuance
The securities issuance literature is replete with signalling models based on 
asymmetric information and adverse selection. Leland and Pyle [1977] argue that 
entrepreneurs have better information about the expected future value o f their projects 
than do outside investors when the entrepreneur is ready to take the firm public. 
Because it is in the entrepreneur’s interest to invest a greater fraction o f his wealth in 
successful projects, Leland and Pyle argue that the market will interpret the firm ’s 
value as being positively related to the fraction o f equity retained by the entrepreneur 
during the going public process.
Myers and M ajluf [1984] develop a signalling model that combines investment 
and financing decisions. This model is based on the assumptions that managers have 
more accurate information about the "true" value o f the firm and any projects it might 
undertake than the market does, and that managers act in the interest o f  "old" 
shareholders who are passive investors. Myers and M ajluf first analyze a case where
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the firm has no new projects. They show that if managers anticipate bad states, i.e. 
states where assets are underperforming, it is rational for managers to issue equity in 
order to maximize shareholder value. Issuing equity is an unambiguous negative 
financial signal that the market uses to assess the private information held by 
managers, in this case, that the firm ’s assets are overvalued. The market then 
revalues the value o f the firm downward.
The second case considered by Myers and M ajluf includes a positive net 
present value (NPV) project. In this example, the market considers announcement of 
the positive NPV project as good news. If  the project is financed by equity, which is 
bad news, the announcement of the project becomes an ambiguous signal. The 
market cannot separate information about new project opportunities from the 
information about the value o f the firm ’s assets in place. Separation is impossible 
because project outcomes and states o f nature are correlated. As a result, an 
underinvestment problem may occur if  the firm chooses to forego some positive NPV 
projects rather than issue equity at a  price it feels is too low.
If  project outcomes and states of nature are uncorrelated, that is, if  the project 
has the same outcome regardless o f the state o f nature, the problem disappears. 
Another means o f overcoming the problem is finding a source o f financing that is not 
subject to the asymmetric information problem. Myers and M ajluf show that if the 
firm uses its available liquid assets, e.g. retained earnings, then all positive NPV 
projects can be undertaken without having to issue equity, which resolves the 
asymmetric information and underinvestment problems.
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Myers [1984] uses the implications o f this model to develop a  pecking order 
theory for financing investment. The theory suggests that firms prefer retained 
earnings as their primary source o f funds for investment. Using an internal source of 
capital avoids the problems related to the ambiguous signal o f externally financing a 
new positive NPV project. Debt is the optimal secondary source o f funds because 
debt financing has payoffs that are less correlated with the states o f nature than equity 
payoffs. Therefore, announcing debt financing for a  new project conveys a less 
negative signal than an announcement of equity financing for a new project. New 
equity is the least preferred source o f funds. Firms will avoid issuing new equity in 
order to circumvent the problems o f having to forego positive NPV projects or issue 
equity at a price they feel is too low.
Miller and Rock [1985] relate dividend and financing decisions to managerial 
expectations about future cash flows in their model o f asymmetric information and 
securities issuance. In M iller and Rock’s model, all external financing decisions are 
interpreted as a negative signal that managers view the firm ’s future prospects 
unfavorably, or more specifically, that future cash flows will be inadequate to meet 
the firm ’s investment and operational needs. The implications of M iller and Rock’s 
model on investment financing are dichotomous and contrast to those o f the Myers 
and M ajluf model, which establishes a hierarchy for choosing a source o f funds.
Empirical studies o f public security issuance are generally consistent with the 
Myers and M ajluf model. Empirical studies by Asquith and Mullins [1986],
Mikkelson and Partch [1986] and Masulis and Korwar [1986] indicate seasoned equity
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issue announcements are associated with significant stock price returns of 
approximately -3 %, which implies that managers issue equity when they have 
unfavorable information about the value of the firm. Linn and Pinegar [1986] and 
Mikkelson and Partch [1986] report non-significant negative excess returns to 
announcements of preferred stock. Dann and Mikkelson [1984], Eckbo [1986], and 
Mikkelson and Partch find non-significant negative excess returns to announcements 
o f straight debt as well.
Restructuring decisions entail the announcement o f both a decision about the 
role of an asset in the firm ’s future operations and the choice o f a mechanism by 
which a change in structure is to be accomplished. Because some of these 
mechanisms involve acquisition of external capital, the securities issuance literature 
implies that the method o f asset restructuring that is selected conveys a signal about 
the value o f the relevant subsidiary and/or the parent firm ’s assets.
Transferring rights to control corporate assets through a sell-off creates cash 
inflows for the parent firm and thus serves as an alternative to issuing new securities 
while at the same time altering the firm ’s production opportunities. An equity carve- 
out by its nature is a securities offering that involves the issuance of equity claims 
without removing assets from the firm’s production set. In contrast, no external 
financing is involved in spin-offs since the firm is merely split up. Because the 
securities issuance literature illustrates the adverse selection problem associated with 
utilizing external financing in an environment in which managers have access to 
information about future cash flows not available to public markets, the three forms o f
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restructuring - sell-offs, carve-outs, and spin-offs - must also be viewed in the context 
o f the securities issuance literature and its relation to the asymmetric information 
perspective.
M ore specifically, this dissertation extends the asymmetric information 
hypothesis o f securities issuance by arguing that management’s private knowledge 
about asset valuation or future cash flows influences the choice o f the mechanism used 
to carry out the restructuring or divestiture o f assets. For example, assuming that 
financing future investment is an integral part o f a restructuring decision so that a 
spin-off is not appropriate, managers may chose to sell-off a division to a third party 
rather than carve it out if they feel that the financial market would not appropriately 
value the assets. In contrast, i f  managers perceive the assets in question are likely to 
be overvalued by the market, they will have an incentive to issue equity in the 
division. If  the firm does not need additional capital or if managers feel that the 
market is undervaluing the division (i.e. managers have favorable private 
information), they may chose to spin-off the division, allowing gains to accrue to 
current shareholders as private information is eventually released to the market 
through future disclosure or the revelation of future cash flows.
In this dissertation, empirical tests o f the relevance o f this hypothesis are 
developed conditioned on the assumption that some elements o f private managerial 
information about relevant assets may be applicable to the industry as a whole. As a 
result, managerial decisions about restructuring mechanisms induce the market to
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adjust prices o f comparable assets throughout the industry depending on the type of 
securities transaction intrinsic to the restructuring mechanism.
3.3. Asymmetric information and intra-industry effects
Intra-industry tests in this disseration parallel those found in the finance and 
accounting literatures. Several studies report evidence that certain managerial 
decisions convey industry-common information while others find evidence that 
managerial decisions convey only firm-specific information. For example, Foster 
[1981] and Clinch and Sinclair [1987] find that unexpected earnings announcements 
contain valuable information related to expected cash flows for other firms in the 
industry. Lang and Stulz [1992] report evidence that rivals o f firms petitioning for 
bankruptcy experience significant negative announcement effects. Consistent with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis, Eckbo [1983] and Stillman [1983] find evidence 
o f positive valuation effects for intra-industry rivals o f targets o f merger and 
acquisition activity. Furthermore, Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck [1991] document 
positive and significant returns to intra-industry rivals for announcements of going- 
private transactions. In contrast, there is evidence that some managerial decisions 
convey only firm-specific information including Hertzel’s [1991] work on intra­
industry effects of share repurchases and Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek’s [1992] 
finding o f no effect on rival share prices for seasoned equity issues.
If private, industry-common information about related assets is conveyed 
through restructuring decisions, the market should revalue intra-industry rivals in
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response to a firm ’s decision to conduct asset disposition and the type of mechanism 
utilized. The market will systematically reprice the equity o f firms conducting closely 
related activities based on expectations about the value o f private, managerial 
information that is conveyed by the decision. The degree o f repricing will be related 
to the degree o f informational asymmetry.
4. The agency cost hypothesis
Jensen and Meckling [1976] first drew attention to the potential loss in value to 
public corporations caused by the conflict of interest between principals and agents. 
Agency costs arise because wealth maximizing incentives are different for corporate 
managers and suppliers o f capital. The agency cost hypothesis is based on difficulties 
involved in writing (or rewriting) and enforcing contracts between managers and 
bondholders, and between owners and managers, that might better align wealth 
maximizing incentives. The former problem is known as bondholder wealth 
expropriation and occurs when managers increase corporate risk to benefit 
shareholders while the contracted rate of return on existing corporate debt remains 
unchanged. Since these contracts cannot be costlessly rewritten, bondholders may 
face higher than contracted for risk. The latter problem is a manifestation of moral 
hazard. This type o f agency cost arises when it is costly to monitor the behavior of 
agents or when it is costly to bond agents.
Jensen [1986] contends that because managers cannot be perfectly monitored, 
decisions that result in a cash inflow may increase agency costs if  the cash is retained
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in the firm. Excess cash may allow corporate aggrandizement as hypothesized by 
Roll [1986] or misuse o f cash in other suboptimal investments, including those which 
facilitate managerial consumption of perquisites. Potential agency costs may also be 
high because managers who face considerable firm-specific risk to their human capital 
have an incentive to diversify. The motivation to diversify stems from the fact that 
much o f the risk to managerial human capital is non-diversifiable. Managers may 
attempt to reduce the risk to their human capital by pursuing projects with expected 
cash flows that are independent of one another, which is not necessarily consistent 
with maximizing firm value. Shareholders will not favor this strategy because they 
can costlessly diversify away non-systematic risk by holding a portfolio o f residual 
claims on many firms. Thus, this divergence o f interests can be harmful to 
shareholder wealth. These agency costs can be checked if  managers retain only 
sufficient cash to finance positive net present value (NPV) projects and release 
remaining funds to shareholders. This minimizes cash resources under management’s 
control. In a related argument, Easterbrook [1984] suggests that dividends and share 
repurchases serve as mechanisms for effective disbursement o f cash, and subject the 
firm to intensive monitoring by financial markets and related external agents such as 
investment bankers.
Within this context, restructuring can either reduce or exacerbate agency costs. 
I f  managerial behavior is characterized by excessive risk aversion, aggrandizement, or 
consumption of perquisites, a divestiture can represent a possible solution for 
correcting agency problems. For example, a  spin-off allows a firm to restructure and
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ameliorate agency costs without raising external capital. The new firm created by the 
spin-off now stands alone, becoming a less diversified entity, and thus is subjected to 
increased monitoring by capital markets. The increase in disclosure o f the new firm ’s 
cash flows, further exposure to the market for managerial labor, and more market 
oriented incentive contracts may induce managers to operate the firm ’s assets more 
efficiently. In contrast, a carve-out or a sell-off generates considerable cash inflows 
which may increase agency problems by fostering corporate aggrandizement or 
consumption of perquisites.
Agency problems are generally firm specific. Thus, if  agency problem 
considerations are the sole source o f changes in the announcing firm ’s equity, 
resolution or intensification o f agency problems resulting from restructuring or asset 
sale decisions should only alter the value o f the announcing firm ’s equity, not the 
equity o f rival firms. Therefore, explanations o f corporate restructuring based on 
agency problems predict that there should be no intra-industry announcement effects.
The next three sections contain detailed reviews o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs, 
and sell-offs with the emphasis on the role that each o f these mechanisms play as a 
form of external capital acquisition. This relates to the basic perspective of this 
dissertation that financing and investment decisions are an integral, but undeveloped 
element o f the corporate restructuring process. A discussion o f the character of 
asymmetric information (that is, favorable or unfavorable) held by managers at the 
time of restructuring can provide new perspective on the incentives o f managers to 
choose one method o f asset disposition over another. Although this discussion is
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largely focused on the relationship o f restructuring to the securities issuance process 
and its implications for intra-industry effects o f these decisions, at various points the 
contrasting implications o f the efficiency and asymmetric information hypothesis are 
developed.
5. Equity carve-outs
On February 7, 1983 Trans World Corporation delivered a  prospectus to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission detailing a proposal to sell shares o f its airline 
unit, Trans World Airlines (TWA). The action came amid troubled times for TWA, 
which had posted operating losses from 1979 to 1982. The proposal outlined Trans 
World Corp’s intention to sell five million TWA shares to the public at an offer price 
between $14 and $17 per share. Trans World Coiporation would retain 84% of the 
ownership o f the airline. Trans World Corporation indicated that the proceeds of the 
equity sale would be used to purchase new airplanes and for general corporate 
purposes.
Trans World Corporation’s decision is a classic example o f a relatively 
uncommon form o f securities issuance, an equity carve-out, in which a portion of a 
wholly-owned subsidiary’s common stock is offered for sale to the public. An equity 
carve-out is similar to a conventional initial public offering because it creates a new 
and distinct set of publicly traded equity claims on the assets o f the subsidiary. As is 
typically the case, Trans World Corporation retained a controlling interest in the
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subsidiary, thus maintaining control over the subsidiary’s assets and operations, so the 
subsidiary does not become an independent, "stand alone" corporation.
As initial public equity issues, both equity carve-outs and conventional IPOs 
can be presumed to be associated with a severe asymmetric information problem 
relative to a bond issue or even a seasoned equity issue due to the lack of historical 
public disclosure of accounting and other data. In addition, managers have 
considerable flexibility to determine the proportion o f equity sold and the timing of 
each o f  these public equity offers, which presumably will occur at an optimal time 
with respect to the manager’s informational advantage. Given this potential for 
adverse selection problems, the firm ’s decision to issue equity is likely to be 
interpreted as an indication of unfavorable private information. With respect to 
seasoned equity issues, this argument is supported by empirical studies which report 
that there is a significant stock price reaction o f -3 % to the issuing firm.
Schipper and Smith [1986] show that the average stock price reaction to a 
public firm offering equity in a  subsidiary is + 2% , contrasting sharply with the 
negative and significant results for equity offerings in the parent firm. Thus, an 
equity carve-out is a form of public equity issuance that is favorably received, on 
average, by the market. Schipper and Smith report that 73 percent o f their sample 
were underwritten equity carve-outs. The remaining carve-outs were sold through 
rights offers and exchange offers.
Schipper and Smith [1986] list several explanations for the positive reaction to 
a parent firm ’s announcing carve-outs. First, the reaction may be ascribed to the
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creation of a separation o f the financing of parent and subsidiary activities. This 
separation can create a  "pure play" investment opportunity that may not already exist 
in the market. For example, when Club M editeranee carved out Club Med, it 
allowed investors the opportunity to own a firm whose only business was operating 
vacation resorts. Club Med was the only public firm of its kind at the time o f the 
offering. Thus, a carve-out may help complete the market by creating unique 
investment opportunities, leading to a positive share price reaction. This would have 
no impact on the valuation of industry rivals who are each components o f larger 
entities.
Second, the market may be reacting to increased efficiency in asset 
management. Efficiency gains may be achieved by eliminating negative managerial 
synergies that may exist with diverse businesses. Elimination of diseconomies of 
scale in management can be realized through improving managerial motivation by 
rewriting incentive contracts to include compensation based on the stock price and 
other performance measures o f the subsidiary rather than the parent. Given market 
efficiency, market prices o f subsidiary stock become valuable indicators of managerial 
performance that can be effective in motivating managers to pursue maximization of 
shareholder wealth. Consistent with this view, Schipper and Smith report that 94 
percent of their sample cases adopted incentive compensation plans based on the 
subsidiary’s stock price. This is effectively an economic efficiency argument which 
predicts that rival share prices should fall, assuming that the subsidiary becomes a 
significantly stronger competitor.
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Improved public understanding o f a subsidiary’s growth opportunities may also 
enhance equity values. Managers can foster more precise market valuation by 
permanently increasing the amount and quality o f public information about assets. In 
an equity carve-out, managers bond themselves to maintain a higher, legally mandated 
level o f financial reporting about the subsidiary’s activities. I f  this method of 
restructuring is interpreted as releasing favorable information regarding future cash 
flows relative to voluntary divisional reporting, carving out a subsidiary will increase 
the market’s perception about the value o f the subsidiary, thus increasing the value of 
the parent firm in response to the announcement. If this information is common to 
other firms in the same industry as the subsidiary, an equity carve-out announcement 
should lead to an increase the value o f rival firms.
In contrast to Schipper and Smith, Nanda [1991] argues that the good news 
associated with an equity carve-out is a securities issuance problem rather than an 
efficiency phenomenon. He models carve-outs in a Myers and M ajluf [1984] security 
issuance framework rather than an economic efficiency framework. Nanda suggests 
that the ability to issue equity tied to a  wholly-owned subsidiary creates an additional 
degree o f managerial freedom in financing subsidiary projects. In Nanda’s model, 
equity carve-outs will generally be chosen when managers believe a  parent firm is 
undervalued by the market and thus are reluctant to issue parent firm equity. Nanda 
demonstrates that the option to utilize an equity carve-out allows firms to invest in 
some subsidiary projects that might otherwise be waived. Although Nanda’s model 
does not develop the case in which a subsidiary is overvalued while the remaining
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assets are fairly valued, presumably managers would have the same incentive to 
carve-out the subsidiary in this situation.
M ore specifically, Nanda’s model indicates that rational managers will 
maximize firm value by choosing to issue equity in a subsidiary when their private 
information leads them to believe the market is likely to overvalue the subsidiary but 
undervalues the parent firm ’s remaining assets. If  the firm is overvalued as a whole, 
then a  standard seasoned equity issue is used. This implies that there is good news in 
an equity carve-out, namely, that managers believe that consolidated firm equity is 
undervalued so the carve-out announcement should induce a positive stock-price 
reaction in the consolidated firm’s equity. However, Nanda’s model also implies that 
there is bad news in an equity carve-out, namely, that managers regard the subsidiary 
as overvalued. If some of the unfavorable private information released in the 
announcement applies to similar industry assets, this implies that an equity carve-out 
should cause a negative stock price reaction for rivals o f the subsidiary being carved 
out. Likewise, if the good news in an equity carve-out is the undervaluation o f the 
parent firm, then the carve-out announcement should induce positive changes in the 
equity o f parent firm rivals.
The efficiency hypothesis implies that the subsidiary and possibly the parent 
firm, become more efficient competitors that indicates that negative stock price 
reactions are predicted for the rivals o f  the carved-out subsidiary and possibly for the 
rivals o f the parent firm. Therefore, if  subsidiary rivals do experience a negative 
valuation effect, the asymmetric information and the efficiency hypotheses are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
indistinguishable. However, the two hypotheses do have distinct predictions for the 
rivals o f the parents. Finally, if firm specific agency considerations are responsible 
for equity carve-outs, there would be no effect on industry rivals for either the 
subsidiary or the parent.
6. Spin-offs
Schipper and Smith [1983] argue that spin-offs are generally similar to carve- 
outs and thus spur economic efficiency. Unlike a carve-out, however, a spin-off 
creates an entity that is financially and administratively independent o f its parent. As 
in the case of a carve-out, the new firm is subject to extensive public disclosure which 
will permanently increase the quality and quantity o f information flowing to the 
market by requiring that two sets of financial reports be permanently supplied to the 
market instead o f a single consolidated report. Thus, both spin-offs and equity carve- 
outs are forms o f restructuring that provide separate valuation of disparate business 
activities. Managerial continuity of the subsidiary is maintained in both cases, but in 
a spin-off subsidiary management becomes fully independent while in a carve-out it 
still reports to the parent firm.
As with carve-outs, there are positive gains to firms announcing spin-offs as 
reported by Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and Owers [1983], and Miles and 
Rosenfeld [1983]. Previous explanations for these gains have largely rested on 
managerial efficiency and pure play arguments. Schipper and Smith argue that firms 
can eliminate negative synergies by separating diverse business activities and thus
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improve operational efficiency. Managerial motivation to increase the profitability of 
subsidiary assets can be enhanced by establishing a compensation system based on 
performance of the subsidiary. Schipper and Smith [1983] also argue there are gains 
from relaxed regulatory constraints. I f  there are important efficiency gains to spin­
offs, there should be negative effects on rivals of the parent and o f the subsidiary.
No support was found for bondholder wealth expropriation as a source o f the 
announcement gains. Specifically, Schipper and Smith and Hite and Owers report 
that there are no significant changes in the bond ratings or bond prices o f the firms 
spinning off subsidiaries. A wealth transfer induced by a spin-off is less likely if: (1) 
the spun-off assets existed as a legal subsidiary prior to the transaction, (2) bond 
covenants protect collateral by restricting dividends, o r (3) debt is allocated to both 
the parent and the subsidiary. Schipper and Smith report that most of their sample 
meets at least one o f these conditions. They indicate that approximately 75 % o f the 
spin-offs were legal subsidiaries prior to the restructuring, about 65% of the sample 
firms had some kind o f dividend constraint or requirement of lender approval, and 
debt was assigned to subsidiaries in 64 o f the 93 sample spin-offs. If spin-offs merely 
represent a redistribution of wealth between bondholders and equity holders and if  this 
redistribution is responsible for the positive announcement effect, then there should be 
no intra-industry effect on rivals. Similarly, if  a spin-off is a means to attenuate firm 
specific agency problems, intra-industry rival equity values will remain unchanged.
From a securities issuance perspective, divesting assets through a  spin-off may 
release private information that allows the market to favorably revalue the relevant
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equity claims on the resulting new firms. I f  the spin-off announcement releases 
information that relevant assets are undervalued, and if  elements o f this information 
are industry-common, then the market will revalue industry assets involved in related 
activities. In general, under this hypothesis rivals with similar assets should be 
revalued upward by the market.
M ore specifically, there is an important difference between spin-offs and 
carve-outs from a  securities issuance perspective. Unlike a carve-out, a spin-off is not 
form o f external financing. Thus, in a Myers and M ajluf [1984] framework a spin-off 
cannot be viewed as a signal o f bad news. Although a carve-out is intrinsically an 
equity issuance phenomenon, the decision by management to split the asset base of a 
consolidated firm without either issuing equity in a division or selling the asset 
outright to a third party may reflect manager’s belief that the subsidiary is 
undervalued by the market. Likewise, avoidance o f an equity issue in a parent firm 
that restructures may also indicate that managers regard the parent firm ’s equity as 
also undervalued.
If  the market assumes that managerial beliefs about this undervaluation reflect 
industry-common information, equity values o f rivals o f the spun-off firm (and 
possibly parent rivals as well) should increase in response to  an announcement of 
restructuring via a spin-off. This prediction for rivals o f parents o f spin-offs can be 
viewed as a parallel Nanda’s [1991] argument for equity carve-outs. It should be 
noted however, that this perspective generates different valuation predictions for rivals 
o f spun-off subsidiaries versus carved-out subsidiaries. In particular, rivals o f the
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spun-off unit should sustain positive share price effects because managers are 
unwilling to issue equity in the subsidiary o r sell the assets outright to a third party.
In contrast, rivals o f subsidiaries to be carved-out should have negative valuation 
effects because of the equity issuance.
The asymmetric information hypothesis prediction o f positive stock price 
reactions for rivals o f the spun-off subsidiary also provides a means for distinguishing 
between securities issuance considerations and the efficiency hypothesis as 
explanations for restructuring. The efficiency hypothesis predicts negative returns to 
subsidiary rivals regardless of the method o f  restructuring. Thus, the asymmetric 
information hypothesis predicts positive valuation effects for rivals of spun-off 
subsidiaries, in contrast to the efficiency hypothesis. Both hypotheses predict negative 
valuation effects for rivals o f carved-out subsidiaries.
7. Asset sell-offs
The most common form o f asset disposition, the sell-off, involves transferring 
the rights to manage a subsidiary from one parent firm to another. Unlike a carve-out 
or a spin-off, a sell-off does not intrinsically create autonomy for the subsidiary.
Much o f the literature on asset sales focuses on the role that these transactions play in 
enhancing economic efficiency or synergy, i .e ., moving resources to higher valued 
uses. Nevertheless, a sell-off also involves a cash inflow to the selling firm through a 
private transaction with an outside party. M iller and Rock’s [1985] model o f security 
issuance implies that any form of security issuance signals bad news about the firm ’s
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future cash flow and early arguments regarding voluntary sell-offs focus on the notion 
that sell-offs signal financial distress, effectively a securities issuance argument. 
However, empirical studies find positive and significant stock price reactions to firms 
announcing a sell-off of 1% to 2 % percent (Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer 
[1984], Linn and Rozeff [1984], and Jain [1985]). Hite, Owers and Rogers [1987] 
confirm this result and report positive and significant average returns of 0.83% to 
buyers as well. They conclude that share price reactions are largely consistent with 
the synergy hypothesis because of the transitory positive revaluation announcement 
effect for the firms that are unable to complete the sale o f the asset. Since the 
revaluation is not permanent, it is unlikely that announcement gains are associated 
with bids that convey private information indicating that the assets are undervalued by 
the market.
Direct sales o f assets can be viewed as a private form of external financing that 
avoids the need to issue equity or other publicly traded instruments. In a sell-off, the 
seller can give a bidder(s) access to private information about the prospects of the 
subsidiary in a way that would be otherwise difficult to do. In the case of multiple 
bidders, the sell-off process effectively becomes an auction. Investment bankers can 
foster an environment in which competing bidders can participate in a  private auction 
that is conducive to the selling firm ’s receiving the fair market price for the assets 
without providing the disclosure associated with the normal public securities issuance 
process.
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This privately negotiated transaction provides an alternative source o f raising 
capital that allows the firm to entirely avoid a  public securities offerings. Positive 
returns to sell-offs are consistent with share price reactions that have been observed 
for other forms o f private financing transactions, suggesting that the market responds 
to private financing more favorably than equivalent public securities. W ruck [1989] 
reports positive and significant returns of 4.5% upon announcements o f privately 
placed equity which is in contrast to the typical negative response o f -2% to -3% 
observed for public equity issues. James [1987] reports positive returns to bank loans 
and high-quality, privately placed debt. In contrast, public debt issues are typically 
associated with non-positive announcement effects. Thus, stock-price reactions to 
corporate financing depend not only on the type of security issued (equity or debt), 
but also on whether issuing securities involves private or public capital raising 
mechanisms.
Although a  sell-off intrinsically leaves the firm ’s potential asset size 
unchanged, it can also be viewed as the partial liquidation of the firm if  the proceeds 
are distributed to bondholders or equity holders rather than retained within the firm. 
Instead o f selling all o f the pieces o f the firm as in a liquidation, managers may find it 
optimal to sell only one component of the firm. Since liquidations are piecemeal sales 
of a firm ’s entire asset base to multiple buyers in which proceeds are distributed to 
shareholders through special dividends following the retirement of more senior claims 
on the assets, the literature on corporate liquidations which has emphasized the role of 
asymmetric information as a motivation for liquidation may provide insight on
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possible incentives for sell-offs. Furthermore, Hite, Owers and Rogers observe 
positive and significant returns to senior debt securities around liquidation 
announcements of 8.57%, a result confirmed by Kim and Schatzberg. This result 
indicates the beneficial effect o f liquidation on senior claimants in addition to the 
positive effects on residual claims. Kim and Schatzberg hypothesize that an auction 
environment with several bidders may induce the increase in market values.
Hite, Owers, and Rogers argue that liquidation announcements convey the 
favorable information that managers view a piecemeal sale o f the firm as generating 
greater value than either the market value o f the firm as an on-going concern or the 
price obtainable from selling the firm as a whole. This hypothesis is consistent with 
the relatively small firm size found in the liquidation samples. Smaller firms are 
followed by fewer analysts and are typically younger firms with modest histories.
Thus, information asymmetry may be inversely related to firm size.
This asymmetric information view of sell-offs is consistent with effects found 
for transactions such as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs). 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice [1984] and Lehn and Poulsen [1989] report strongly 
significant, positive average LBO announcement effects of 22% and 20%, 
respectively. Possible sources o f these gains include (1) tax benefits, (2) increased 
management incentives and reduced agency costs, (3) wealth transfer effects, (4) 
efficiency considerations, and (5) asymmetric information and underpricing. While it 
is difficult to empirically separate many of these explanations, there is considerable 
support for the hypothesis that going private bids convey private asymmetric
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information. For example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice [1984] find that going- 
private bids not brought to fruition are still positive events for the target, which 
suggests a permanent upward revaluation o f firm equity. Slovin, Sushka, and 
Bendeck [1991] report positive and significant stock price reactions to intra-industry 
rivals o f firms receiving LBO or MBO offers. They argue that these valuation 
effects are a result o f bidders releasing industry-common information about asset 
values. Because no consolidation of operating firms occurs, these effects cannot be 
attributed to synergies or monopoly power.
From an asymmetric information perspective, an acquisition o f a division 
indicates that the buyer voluntarily pays a price greater than the asset’s worth to the 
seller. Similar to LBOs, the decision to purchase an asset is presumably preceded by 
expenditure o f resources by the buyer to determine the value o f the relevant assets. 
This suggests that such an acquisition entails the production o f private information by 
the buyer regarding the value o f relevant assets that is not available in the public 
domain. Thus, the information hypothesis implies that bidders in sell-offs reveal 
positive, private information about the unit. If this information relates only to the 
suboptimal operating policies of current management or to the inefficiency o f the 
firm ’s organizational structure, then the gains from an announcement that the asset is 
to be sold will be firm specific. However, if  the announcement reveals positive 
private information about the true value o f the subsidiary’s assets and if  some o f this 
information applies to the industry, the market would increase the value o f the equity 
o f the divested unit’s rivals. Since a single buyer agrees to purchase the unit and
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there is no issuance o f equity tied to the unit, valuation effects on rivals o f the 
divested unit should be more favorable than an equity carve-out.
Because the selling o f an asset may serve as a form o f securities issuance, it 
may also communicate information to the market regarding the value o f parent firm’s 
equity and in turn, the value o f its rivals. From a M iller and Rock viewpoint, any 
form o f securities issuance represents bad news about managers’ expectations about 
future cash flows. From this perspective, an asset sell-off conveys unfavorable news 
about the value o f the parent firms.
In contrast, Myers and M ajluf [1984] and Nanda [1991] predict managers will 
avoid equity issues when their firm’s equity is undervalued by the market. If  a sell- 
off reflects management’s choice to forego a parent firm equity issue because of its 
view that the equity is undervalued, then a sell-off announcement could cause positive 
stock price reactions to rivals of the selling firm if the announcement contains 
industry-common information. In a sell-off the firm does choose an action that may 
raise financing externally, generally a negative event. Nevertheless, the decision to 
sell a subsidiary may be more closely related in nature to other methods o f private 
financing such as bank loans and privately placed debt, which are generally viewed as 
positive events, since none o f these transactions involve significant disclosure of 
information to the public. Instead, the seller communicates sufficient private 
information to the buyer to facilitate the transaction rather than providing extensive 
public information to financial market participants. From this perspective, assuming 
that not all of the information is firm specific, there would be a positive effect on
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rivals o f the parent firm. Thus, the securities issuance perspective leads to ambiguous 
predictions with respect to valuation effects o f sell-off announcements on rivals o f 
selling firms.
If the proceeds from a sell-off are retained by management, sell-offs may 
exacerbate agency costs. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] relate asset sales and 
agency costs based on Jensen’s free cash flow argument. They argue their evidence is 
inconsistent with the operating efficiency view of Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987]. 
They report that firms near distress account for the majority o f asset sales and that 
investors place greater value on asset sales where proceeds are used to retire debt than 
if  the cash is utilized by the firm. M oreover, they report that there is no significant 
stock price reaction to sell-offs for companies that retain the proceeds for use within 
the firm.
This agency hypothesis implies stock-price reactions for rivals o f divested units 
and parents in response to sell-offs may differ based on the use o f the proceeds. In 
particular, if  Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz’s conclusion that retention o f funds indicates 
that a sell-off is largely related to agency difficulties, this firm-specific perspective 
implies that there should not be significant positive intra-industry effects for rivals of 
parents that channel these funds into core business activities. In contrast, if  a sell-off 
and reinvestment strategy indicates that managers are confident about the future 
prospects o f core business activities, rivals o f parent firms should sustain positive 
returns.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
Finally, i f  a sell-off conveys information about the financial distress o f a firm’s 
core business, this signal may be good news for the intra-industry rivals if  it indicates 
the possible demise o f a competitor, or it may be bad news for rivals if  it signals 
deteriorating expectations on the part o f managers about future industry conditions. In 
this regard, Lang and Stulz [1992] report evidence that rivals o f firms petitioning for 
bankruptcy experience significant losses in equity value. This suggests that the 
industry information effects dominate any possible competitive effect. If  this is the 
case, and if  retention o f the proceeds of the sell-off is viewed as an indication o f the 
firm ’s failing core business, the asset sell-off should convey negative news about the 
related industry and parent firm rivals so there should be negative returns to rivals of 
parent firms in response to sell-off announcements. The predicted announcement 
effects for parent firms, rivals o f parent firms, and rivals o f subsidairies for each 
method o f restructuring under each of the three hypotheses are found in Table 2.
8. Summary
Several studies document the significant positive announcement effects o f 
equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs. The gains associated with these 
restructuring decisions are largely attributed in earlier literature to capturing potential 
efficiency gains by moving assets to higher valued uses or the release o f private 
information that allows the market to revalue assets accordingly. Viewing 
restructuring decisions within the context of financing decisions and the securities 
issuance literature provides a means to distinguish between the two hypotheses. In
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Table 2
Predicted direction o f equity revaluation for the relevant firm subject to the 








Carveout Positive Positive Negative*
Spin-off Positive Positive
Sell-off Positive (no equity issued) 
Negative (capital acquisition) 
Negative (financial distress)
Positive Negative*




Sell-off Positive (no equity issued) 
Positive (competitors distress) 
Negative (industry distress)
Negative





* I f  cash is retained within the firm. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz argue that if  cash 
proceeds are not retained within the firm, returns to parents o f sell-offs should be 
positive and significant. Their empirical results support this argument.
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particular, if  managerial decisions convey elements of information that are relevant to 
other firms in the industry, the efficiency and asymmetric information hypotheses can 
be separated because each renders unique predictions for returns to intra-industry 
rivals.
The efficiency hypothesis predicts negative returns to rivals o f carved-out, 
spun-off, or sold-off subsidiaries because rivals are now facing more efficient, 
competitive entities. The asymmetric information hypothesis also predicts negative 
revaluations for rivals o f equity carve-outs because issuing equity is viewed as an 
unfavorable signal about asset values or future cash flows o f related assets.
Conversely, the asymmetric information hypothesis predicts positive revaluation 
effects to rivals of spun-off subsidiaries. If  managers perceive the value o f a 
subsidiary as being higher than the value the market places on those assets or the 
value obtainable in a privately negotiated transaction, they may spin-off o f the 
subsidiary and allow the market to revalue the assets based in accordance with the 
release o f private information. Sell-offs involve a type o f securities issuance that 
utilizes private financing mechanisms which renders ambiguous predictions about 
intra-industry rivals. If  these transactions imply the expectation o f higher future 
profits within an industry because o f the use o f private financing, rivals’ share prices 
should rise. I f  the external financing aspect is dominant, rival share prices are 
predicted to fall. The securities issuance perspective also yields more complex 
predictions about the effect o f equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs on rivals of 
parent firms.
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Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and Asymmetric Information
1. Introduction
This chapter relates recent literature on initial public offerings to the 
phenomenon of equity carve-outs because both o f these securities issuance decisions 
involve the initial sale o f equity claims that are to be publicly traded. Each 
transaction takes place in an environment in which managers have the freedom to time 
the equity offer and determine the proportion o f equity to be sold to the public. 
Because the IPO market is associated with adverse selection problems, asymmetric 
information arguments paralleling those developed to explain equity carve-out 
decisions are analyzed in light of the empirical evidence associated with IPOs. The 
efficiency hypothesis is only applicable as it relates to the use o f compensation 
contracts based on market performance to improve managers’ incentives. Arguments 
o f diseconomies in management or enhanced operational structures are not relevant to 
the IPO case because no assets are transferred between firms and therefore no 
economies o f scale or scope are obtainable.
An IPO is a financial, rather than an economic, restructuring. The empirical 
evidence developed in this dissertation indicates that there are significant intra-industry 
effects to IPOs which leads to conclusions similar to those derived from the equity 
carve-out evidence; that is, announcements o f both equity carve-outs and IPOs are 
associated with negative valuation effects o f related industry assets. These results
71
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support the argument that equity carve-out and IPO announcements reveal private, 
managerial information reflecting management’s perceptions of future changes in 
industry asset values, industry risk, and/or cash flows.
2. The literature on IPOs
Generally, efficiency arguments are not applicable in the IPO case because no 
assets are transferred between firms. However, managerial efficiency may be 
improved by forming compensation contracts based on market performance measures. 
If  this is a primary motivation in the decision to IPO, then rivals may experience 
negative stock price reactions to IPO announcements because they are facing a 
potentially more efficient competitor.
Initial public offerings involve the sale of equity in closely-held firms where 
existing shareholders may possess non-public information. Similar to equity carve- 
outs, entrepreneurs decide when and what proportion o f the firm to sell to outside 
investors. A considerable body of literature has argued that the market for IPOs may 
suffer from adverse selection problems and has used this framework o f analysis to 
explain the phenomenon o f underpricing that is characteristic o f IPOs. In addition, 
because managers have considerable options regarding the use o f proceeds, the 
potential for moral hazard is also associated with IPOs. In these respects the IPO 
market bears similarities to equity carve-outs.
Access to financing in private markets may allow some firms with favorable 
private information to avoid or postpone an IPO. Private financing allows a  high-
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quality firm to prosper and grow while developing reputational capital that may help it 
ameliorate potential adverse selection problems in financial markets. Commercial 
bank loans and venture capital financing are sources o f external funds which may 
allow a high-quality firm to acquire necessary funding for future operations while 
maintaining the benefits of its proprietary information. Slovin and Young [1990], 
James and W ier [1990], and Megginson and Weiss [1991] report that financial 
contracts with commercial banks and venture capitalists act as a certification 
mechanism that reduces the underpricing associated with IPOs.
Given the availability of private funding for firms with favorable inside 
information, announcements of the intent to go public may suggest an adverse 
selection problem. If managers possess unfavorable non-public information about 
asset values or future cash flows, there is an incentive to go public before the 
information reaches financial markets. In doing so, insiders capture a higher price for 
the equity than might otherwise be possible at a later date when the information 
becomes public.
Previous literature has concentrated on the behavior o f IPO underpricing and 
no attention had been focused on the information effects of announcements o f intent to 
go public, largely because no equity o f the announcing firm trades at that time. If, 
however, announcements of intent to go public indicate an adverse selection problem 
and serve as an unfavorable signal about the value o f relevant assets, and if  this 
information applies to other firms in the industry, there should be negative intra­
industry effects on this date.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Formal models of the IPO market developed by Leland and Pyle [1977], 
Titman and Trueman [1986], Grinblatt and Hwang [1989], Allen and Faulhaber
[1989], and Welch [1989] assume that an adverse selection problem exists and suggest 
that IPO decisions are likely to signal unfavorable information about the value o f the 
underlying assets. Included in these models are mechanisms that high-quality firms 
can employ to temper the unfavorable information content of these announcements. 
Among these signalling mechanisms are (1) the proportion o f the firm retained by the 
entrepreneur, (2) the degree o f underpricing, and (3) the employment o f prestigious 
auditors. Booth and Smith [1986], Beatty and Ritter [1986], and Carter and Manaster
[1990] develop models which indicate that the use o f prestigious underwriters in an 
IPO also serves to certify firm quality. Welch’s model o f the IPO market, in which 
well-informed entrepreneurs offer equity to less well informed outside investors, 
closely accords with the arguments developed earlier in this dissertation relating to 
equity carve-outs. Thus, the tests developed earlier for equity carve-outs that are 
based on private managerial information being conveyed in securities issuance 
decisions can also be applied to IPOs. Similar to the equity carve-out case, it is 
hypothesized that if  IPOs are indicative of unfavorable non-public information about 
relevant asset values, and if elements o f the information are applicable to related 
industry assets, then equity of intra-industry rivals is likely to be overvalued by the 
market. Thus, an announcement of the intent to go public may cause a downward 
revision of the equity o f intra-industry rivals.
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In contrast, Rock [1986] develops a model of adverse selection in IPO markets 
that provides a different explanation for the underpricing associated with IPOs. He 
argues that the informational differences among investors will result in a  winner’s 
curse problem. Rock models the IPO market given the dichotomous condition of 
perfectly informed and completely uninformed investors. He observes that fully 
informed investors only participate in an initial offering if  the offer is underpriced. If  
the offer is overpriced, only the uninformed investors purchase shares so that these 
investors purchase all o f the shares o f overpriced issues. In contrast, uninformed 
investors compete with fully informed investors for the underpriced issues. Rock 
concludes that uninformed investors, aware of this adverse selection problem, will 
only participate in IPOs if  the offers are, on average, underpriced sufficiently to 
compensate them for the bias they face in the allocation process. I f  this 
characterization o f the IPO market is correct, an announcement o f an IPO does not 
convey private information to the public because o f the assumed information structure,
i.e. perfectly informed investors have an informational advantage over managers. As 
a result, there should be no stock price effects on rivals o f the announcing firm.
Benveniste and Spindt [1989] argue that investment bankers use underpricing 
for information acquisition. Underpricing is used to induce investors to truthfully 
release information pertinent to pricing the IPO during the pre-issuing period. Baron 
and Holstrom [1980] and Baron [1982] focus on informational asymmetries between 
the firm and the investment banker to explain the underpricing o f IPOs. They 
hypothesize that the investment bank’s superior knowledge o f market conditions
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allows it to expend less marketing effort, while enhancing relationships with its clients 
who purchase IPOs, by underpricing new issues. However, M uscarella and 
Vetsuypens [1989] find that investment banking firms underprice themselves when 
they go public as well, casting doubt on this explanation. Finally, Tinic [1988] posits 
that underpricing IPOs may be a rational response by investment bankers who seek to 
reduce the frequency and severity o f law suits. The hypothesis stems from the fact 
that the Securities Act of 1933 makes all signatories liable for any material omissions 
in the prospectus. If underpricing o f IPOs reflects information gathering techniques, 
monopsonistic power o f investment bankers, or attempts to circumvent future legal 
liabilities, the announcement o f an IPO by the firm’s managers should have no share 
price effects on rival firm equity.
3. Sum m ary
The notion o f managers possessing an informational advantage (Welch [1989]) 
contrasts with the assumptions o f Rock [1986] (well informed outside investors with 
an informational advantage over other investors and managers) and Baron and 
Holstrom [1980], and Baron [1980], who assume investment bankers are better 
informed than managers. If managers possess private information, as modeled by 
Welch, and if  elements o f the information are industry common, then the decision to 
go public may result in negative valuation effects on intra-industry rivals.
Conversely, if  managers do not have private information, as argued by Rock, Baron
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and Holstrom, and Baron, then an IPO decision should not convey information that 
will impact rival firm ’s equity values.
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Chapter 5 
Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
1. Introduction
This chapter describes the data selection criterion and methodology used to 
calculate stock price returns in this dissertation. Section 1 details the data collection 
and sample construction. The second section describes market model methodology 
which is used to empirically measure announcement effects o f restructuring decisions. 
Section 3 contains descriptive statistics o f the samples used in the study.
2. Sample generation
Each of the samples used in this study is developed from firms listed on the 
New York and American Stock Exchanges (NYSE and AMEX, respectively). For 
both carve-outs and spin-offs, there is a requirement that the newly traded equity also 
be listed on NYSE/AMEX. This requirement assures that these events are o f major 
importance. This requirement also implies that all of the events used in each sample 
represent ultimately completed transactions.
The first set of sample firms is comprised of parent firms announcing an equity 
carve-out, intra-industry rivals of the parent firm, and rivals of the subsidiary being 
carved-out. The second set o f sample firms includes parent firms announcing a  spin­
off, their intra-industry rivals, and the rivals o f the subsidiary being spun-off. The 
date of the Dow Jones News W ire press release is used to identify the announcement
78
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date o f the equity carve-out and spin-off transactions. The third sample contains firms 
announcing sell-offs, the rivals of parent firms, and the rivals o f the divested units. 
The event date for a sell-off transaction is date o f the Wall Street Journal article 
announcing the sale of the assets to an identified purchaser, to an unidentified 
purchaser, or in an auction where the purchaser is not immediately identifiable.
The following selection criteria are used to further refine the samples and 
narrow the focus of the dissertation to U .S. industrial firms:
(1) Closed-end funds (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are 
excluded from all three samples. Financial firms are also excluded.
(2) Events in which parent firms announce restructuring decisions 
concurrently with other major corporate decisions or activities are also 
omitted from the analysis
(3) Foreign firms (parents and subsidiaries) are excluded from the 
samples. However, U.S. rivals o f these firms are included in the 
analysis o f rival portfolios.
Rivals portfolios for parent firms and disposed asset(s) are created by matching 
4-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC). The SIC codes for parent firms 
and disposed subsidiaries/divisions are retrieved from the CRSP tapes and Predicast. 
This classification is checked using Standard and Poor’s quarterly stock reports and 
Value Line to ensure that the SIC code accurately identifies the firm ’s major business 
activity. Once the event firm ’s SIC code is established, CRSP, Value Line, and 
Predicast are used to identify other firms whose major business activity corresponds to
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the same industry as the event firm. These rival firms are identified as firms carrying 
the same 4-digit SIC code. Standard and Poor’s quarterly stock reports are then used 
to confirm each potential rival’s core business and SIC code before the firm is 
included in the event firm ’s portfolio o f rivals.
The equity carve-out sample covers the period 1981-1990. The development 
o f procedures in 1983 by the NYSE enabling firms to list concurrently with their IPO 
is reflected in the data which shows these transactions become more common by the 
mid-1980’s (table 6). The sole sample carve-out prior to 1983 is listed on the 
AMEX. Firms qualifying for direct listing must meet requirements on the market 
value o f shares, the number o f shares, and the number o f shareholders. This sample 
is developed by identifying the first-trade dates on the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) daily returns file. Only new listings that can be verified as 
equity carve-outs using the Wall Street Journal. M oody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and 
the National Stock Summary are retained in the sample. This procedure produces a 
total o f 36 eligible equity carve-outs. After omitting parent firms with SIC codes 
4900-4999 and 6000-6999, and firms lacking sufficient data in the estimation period 
(i.e. firms trading on fewer than one-half of the total trading days in the estimation 
period), the parent group contains 22 events for which there are 21 rival portfolios 
with matching 4-digit SIC codes. There are 25 rival portfolios fo r the carved-out 
subsidiaries. The parent group has three fewer events than the carved-out rival group 
because the parents o f three o f the carve-outs are financial firms and are omitted from 
the study.
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The spin-off sample also covers the period 1981 to 1990 for reasons similar to 
those explained above. Stock distributions coded as spin-offs on the CRSP Daily 
M aster File are used to create a sample of 54 announcements. These announcements 
are verified in the same manner as the carve-outs. Excluded from this sample are 
four spin-off announcements that are part o f management’s defensive tactics against 
takeover attempts. Seventeen more announcements are excluded because o f the parent 
firm ’s industry classification or because o f missing returns data in the estimation 
period. The final sample for the spin-off group consists o f 33 parent firms for which 
25 parent rival portfolios are developed. Portfolios o f rival firms for 37 spun-off 
subsidiaries are available.
The spin-off rival sample is associated with four more events than the parent 
sample due to announcements containing multiple spin-offs. Rollins Incorporated 
(June 4, 1986) and General Mills (September 24, 1985) both announced that they 
were each spinning o ff two subsidiaries simultaneously. Therefore, these two 
announcements are associated with a total o f two parent firms and four spun-off 
subsidiaries. Household International (January 11, 1989) announced that it would be 
forming three new stand alone firms by spinning off three o f its subsidiaries. Thus, 
this announcement is associated with one parent firm and three spun-off subsidiaries. 
These three announcements account for the difference in the number of observations 
in the two samples.
Firms announcing sell-offs are identified by using Mergers & Acquisitions’ 
annual "Largest Divestitures" and "Top 100" transactions lists for the period 1981 to
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1991. This results in 322 announcements for which sell-off dates are verified in the 
Wall Street Journal index. By employing the same selection criteria outlined above 
and excluding foreign firms, 175 sell-off events are identified. The sample o f rivals 
o f the selling parents comprises 167 portfolios. There are 190 portfolios o f rivals of 
sold-off subsidiaries. The subsidiary rival sample contains more events than the sell- 
o ff parent sample because several o f the parent firms are conglomerates, foreign or 
private companies, or are not traded on the NYSE or AMEX.
Firms involved in conventional IPOs are identified as those firms associated 
with start-up trading on the CRSP daily returns file. The IPOs are verified using the 
Wall Street Journal. M oody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and the National Stock Summary. 
The sample begins in 1983 when the NYSE developed procedures allowing firms to 
list concurrently with their initial public offering, and ends in 1990. The sample of 
intra-industry rivals consists of firms sharing the same 4-digit SIC code as firms 
announcing a conventional IPO.
For inclusion in the sample, each event must have at least one intra-industry 
rival with returns for a sufficient number of trading days to estimate the market 
model. Excluded from this sample are conglomerates (SIC 9980), closed-end funds 
and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). There are 72 IPOs 
and corresponding rival portfolios (257 total rivals) in the final sample.
A subgroup of 38 o f the parent firms announcing general corporate 
restructurings is also identified. In these announcements the firm typically states that 
it intends to concentrate on a few o f its primary businesses and streamline itself by
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shedding the remaining assets in the near future. Often the announcement indicates 
that the firm has hired an investment banker to advise them on their restructuring and 
assist them with asset disposition. These restructuring announcements are found in 
the 18 months prior to, or subsequent to, an asset disposition announcement via sell- 
off or spin-off. O f these 29 events, 25 portfolios o f rival firms o f the restructuring 
firms are developed.
3. Methodology
Stock price reactions to announcements o f corporate restructuring are measured 
using standard event study methodology as described in Brown and Warner [1985]. 
Under semi-strong form market efficiency, the announcement effects provide unbiased 
valuation adjustments corresponding to the information contained in the announcement 
and changes in the perceptions of the firm ’s asset values, future cash flows, and risk, 
held by the market. Standard event study methodology will also allow the results of 
this dissertation to be easily compared to the results reported in earlier event studies 
using similar methodology.
Event study methodology requires parameters o f a returns generating process, 
which are obtained via an ordinary least squares regression. The parameters o f the 
regression are estimated over an interval that is chronologically close to, but does not 
include, the announcement window. This estimation process is refer to as the market 
model, which is described as:
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RJt = ctj + P / mr + ejt (1)
where:
Rjt =  the return for firm j on day t,
Gj =  mean return not explained by the market,
/?j =  firm j ’s sensitivity to the market’s return - its
risk factor,
Rmt =  return of the market index for day t,
ejt =  the statistical error or the regression residual.
The predicted return for a firm for a day in the event period is the return given by the
market model on that day using the estimates o f gj and (3i from the pre-event period.
That is, the predicted return for firm j on day t is:
The share price reaction for the parent firms announcing a  corporate 
restructuring are estimated by calculating the average daily prediction error (APE) 
using the market model around the event date t= 0 , defined as the announcement date. 
The average daily prediction errors are calculated as:
(2)
The prediction error, PE, is defined as:
(3)
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where N  is the number o f firms in the sample trading on day t. Cumulative average 
prediction errors, CAPE, defined as the sum of the daily average predictions errors 
over some relevant time period, say t= t, to t= t2, are calculated as:
h
CAPE  = Y ,A P E t (5)
«=t,
The equal weighted CRSP index is used as the explanatory variable in the least 
squares regression. The pre-event estimation period used to estimate the market 
model is t =-240 to t= -121 . For subsequent statistical tests, the null hypothesis is that 
the APE is equal to zero for each event subperiod. The test statistic is the ratio o f the 
APE (CAPE) to its standard deviation (the square root of the product of D, the 
number of days in the event window, and the variance) estimated over the pre-event 
period. The test statistic is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis if  the 
APE are independent, identically distributed and normal.
For the equity carve-out and spin-off samples, the event window used to 
compare and interpret announcement stock price reactions is defined as t= 0  and 
t=  +  l ,  where t= 0  is the Dow Jones News W ire date. In both cases, the 
announcement reaction is usually concentrated on day 0. However, to obtain results 
that are more readily comparable to previous event study results, the conventional 
two-day window is adopted. A two-day window also facilitates capture of
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announcement effects for announcements occurring late in one trading day that may 
create spill-over effects on the following trading day. For the sell-off sample, the 
event window is defined as t = - l  and t= 0 , where t= 0  is the Wall Street Journal date. 
The window is defined in this manner because the news wire usually carries the 
announcement on the day prior to its appearance in the Wall Street Journal.
Therefore, the day previous to the WSJ date is included in the measurement o f the 
market’s reaction to the announcement.
Equally weighted portfolios of intra-industry rivals are created to obtain 
prediction errors associated with the industry effects o f asset disposition 
announcements. Prediction errors for each rival are calculated using the same 
methodology described above. The mean prediction errors for the rival portfolios are 
calculated by averaging the adjusted returns over all portfolios for each day in the 
relevant subperiod.
4. Sample descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the equity carve-out, IPO, spin-off, and sell-off 
samples are found in Tables 3-7. The distribution for the market value o f the 
subsidiaries involved in the restructuring transactions is reported in Table 3. For the 
equity carve-outs, IPOs, and spin-offs, the market value is defined as the product of 
the number of shares outstanding and the price per share four weeks after the initial 
trading day. Because o f the requirement that the equity of these new firms must 
begin trading on the NYSE/AMEX, the samples used in this dissertation tend to be
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Table 3
The distribution o f market values1 o f newly traded public firms created through an 
equity carve-out, an IPO, or a spin-off are given in panel A. For sell-off 
transactions, the distribution o f values reflects sales prices. The distribution o f parent 
market values2 two days prior to the restructuring announcement is given in panel B. 
The distribution o f  the relative size of the disposed assets/equity issue to the parent 
firm is given in panel C.
Equity
carve-outs IPOs Spin-offs Sell-offs
Panel A: Newly traded public firm ’s market value o f equity 
and sell-off transaction price ($ millions)
N = 25 N = 72 N = 3 7 N =179
Mean 692.37 155.04 319.70 657.19
Median 462.15 68.04 198.00 507.10
Maximum 2,687.50 1,913.63 1,824.52 4149.60
Minimum 12.86 6.77 106.17 79.00
Panel B: Market value of parent firms ($ millions)
Mean 3,161,606 155.04 1,473,670 5,644,937
Median 1,431,021 61.04 1,076,400 2,371,841
Maximum 14,659,177 1,916.63 6,437,376 74,058,416
Minimum 56,657 6.77 16,273 133,204
Panel C: Proportion o f disposed asset/equity issue market value to parent 
market value
Mean 16.00% 45.68% 29.99% 32.71%
Median 6.00% 41.00% 21.11% 17.47%
Maximum 86.42% 100.00% 114.02% 223.83%
Minimum 1.23% 10.00% 4.83% 0.76%
‘Market value is defined as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the market 
price per share four weeks after the initial trading day for equity carve-outs, IPOs and 
spin-offs.
2Market value is defined as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the market 
price per share two days prior to the initial announcement o f a restructuring decision.
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substantially larger than those used in previous studies. For the sell-off sample, the 
value is defined as the price received by the selling firm. This sample is also larger, 
on average, than samples used in previous studies. This difference is largely due to 
the fact that assets sales tend to increase in size through time. The difference may 
also be a function o f the financial condition o f the sample firms. For example, the 
proportion o f distressed selling firms in this sample appears to be significantly smaller 
than that in the Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] sample.
For the 25 equity carve-outs in this sample the mean (median) value is $692 
million ($462 million) versus a median value o f $20-$30 million for Schipper and 
Smith [1986] sample. For the 72 conventional IPO announcements the mean and 
median values are $155 million and $61 million respectively. Thus, the equity carve- 
outs are large relative to conventional IPOs. The 37 spin-off transactions create new 
firms with an mean (median) market value of $319 million ($198 million). Previous 
studies on spin-offs by Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and Owers [1983], and Miles 
and Rosenfeld [1983] do not report the absolute market value of spun-off units. For 
179 sell-off transactions the mean (median) sale price is $657 million ($507 million). 
The asset sales in this sample are large relative to the samples used by Lang, Poulsen, 
and Stulz, and the Hite and Owers, who report mean (median) sale values o f $124 
million ($28 million) and $79 million ($44 million), repsectively.
Parent firms performing equity carve-outs tend to be larger, on average, than 
those involved in spin-offs, but smaller than parent firms involved in sell-offs. The 
mean (median) market value of the parents firms performing carve-outs is $3.2 billion
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($1.4 billion). The relatively smaller spin-off parent firms have a mean (median) 
market value o f $1.5 billion ($1 billion). The mean (median) market value of sell-off 
parents is $5.6 billion ($2.4 billion). Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz report mean and 
median equity values for sell-off parent firms o f $949 million and $150 million 
respectively. Thus, the market value of parent firm equity and the sell-off transaction 
price are substantially larger in this sample than in samples used in previous studies.
The distributions o f the ratio of the value o f the restructuring transaction to the 
market value of equity o f the parent firm are reported in Panel C of Table 3. For 
equity carve-out transactions, the ratio is defined as the proceeds from the issue of 
subsidiary equity divided by the market value o f the parent firm two days prior to the 
announcement o f the intent to carve out the subsidiary. The mean (median) ratio in 
this sample is 16 percent (six percent), which is smaller than the median ratio of 
approximately 10 percent reported by Schipper and Smith [1986]. Even though the 
mean proceeds in this sample are twice as large as those in Schipper and Smith’s 
sample, the mean parent firm market value o f equity in the former sample is several 
times larger than in latter sample, accounting for the smaller median ratio found in the 
former sample.
For spin-offs, the ratio is defined as the market value equity o f the new 
publicly traded firm 28 days subsequent to the initial trade date, divided by the market 
value o f equity of the parent firm two days prior to the initial announcement of the 
spin-off. The mean (median) ratio is 30 percent (21 percent) and is substantially 
larger than the median of 6.6 percent reported by Hite and Owers [1983]. Similar to
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the equity carve-out transactions, this sample o f spin-off transactions contains larger 
parent firms spinning off larger portions o f assets than in previous studies.
The relative value ratio for sell-off transactions is calculated by dividing the 
sale price o f divested assets by the market value o f equity o f the parent firm two days 
before the announcement o f the asset sale. The mean (median) proportion sold in this 
sample is 33 percent (17 percent). The mean (median) proportion reported by Hite 
and Owers is 16 percent (eight percent), indicating that the firms in their sample are 
selling off fewer assets relative to the parent firm size. Conversely, Lang, Poulsen, 
and Stulz report mean (median) ratios o f 69 percent (22 percent). However, it should 
be noted that this sample contains a  larger proportion o f distressed firms in need o f 
capital which suggests that these firms should have to sell-off a larger proportion of 
their relatively smaller asset base.
Table 4 provides the distribution of the market values for rival firms and the 
number of rivals per event. The new firms created by an equity carve-out tend to be 
larger than their rivals. The distribution of market values for these rivals has a mean 
(median) market value o f over $1.1 billion ($278 million) but is skewed by a few 
relatively large firms which explains why the mean market value o f the rivals is large 
compared to that o f the equity carve-outs. The 25 rival portfolios include 150 
individual rivals. Mean and median number o f rivals per event are 6 and 5 
respectively. The mean (median) size o f the rival firms o f IPOs o f $800 million 
($214 million) is notably larger than that of the announcing firms. This is in contrast 
to the case o f equity carve-outs. There is a mean (median) of 3.57 (2) rivals per
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the market value o f intra-industry rivals o f carve-outs, IPOs, 
spin-offs, and sell-offs are given in panel A. Descriptive statistics for the number of 







Panel A: Rival firm market value o f equity
oi
ni—HII£ N = 257 N =223 N = 1623 2 II
Mean 1,132.20 800.15 903.92 3,799,439 2,349,603
Median 278.82 214.15 165.27 1,239,596 607,296
Maximum 27,267.02 15,520.06 24,088.00 80,951,136 74,077,488
Minimum 7.96 3.51 3.06 1026 1519
Panel B: Number o f Rivals per event
Mean 6.0 3.6 6.0 9.0 6.9
Median 5 2 5 7 5
Maximum 36 19 33 30 29
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1
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event and 257 total rivals included in the study. The rivals of spun-off units have a 
mean (median) market value o f $903 million ($165 million). There are 223 individual 
rival firms comprising 37 rivals portfolios. The mean (median) numbers o f rivals per 
spin-off announcement are 6 and 5, respectively. The market value o f rivals o f the 
parent firms o f sell-offs is substantially larger than that o f the rivals o f any other 
group but are smaller on average, than the parents themselves. The mean and median 
market values for these rival firms are $3.8 billion and $1.2 billion respectively. The 
mean (median) rival portfolio consists o f nine (seven) firms. The market values of 
the rivals o f the sold-off units are also substantially larger than those o f the rivals of 
the carve-outs, spin-offs, and IPOs. These rivals firms have a mean (median) o f $2.3 
billion ($607) million. The mean number o f rival firms per portfolio is seven, the 
median is five.
Distributions for the offer size, initial returns, and the proportion o f equity 
ownership retained by the parent (owner/mangers) for carve-outs and IPOs are 
provided in Table 5. Offer size is calculated as the product of the number of shares 
sold to the public and the offer price. Underpricing (i.e. initial returns) is calculated 
as the percentage price change from offering price to closing price on the first day of 
trading. Equity carve-out transactions have a mean (median) offer size o f  $259 
million ($102 million). The mean and median underpricing is 2.03% and 1.25% 
respectively. The mean underpricing o f this sample is similar to that o f Schipper and 
Smith’s [1986], who report an average underpricing o f 1.70%. Fifty two percent of 
this sample’s initial returns are positive and 36% are zero.
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Descriptive statistics for offer size and underpricing for equity carve-outs 
and initial public offerings.
Equity carve-outs 
N = 2 5
IPOs
N = 7 2










Proportion of returns >  0 0.52 0.65
Proportion of returns <  0 0.36 0.19





‘Defined as the offer price multiplied by the shares sold to the public, excluding 
overallotments.
2Defined as the percentage price change from the offering price to the closing price on 
the first day o f trading.
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For conventional IPOs, the mean (median) offer size is $45 million ($19 
million) and the mean (median) initial return is 4.78% (1.76%). The average initial 
return is low relative to previous studies such as Ritter [1984] who reports average 
underpricing of 9.6% for 382 firms (mostly NASDAQ and OTC) with sales greater 
than $4 million. Comparing the NYSE/AMEX IPO results and Ritter’s results 
through a difference in means test yields a t-statistic o f 3.02, indicating rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the mean underpricing for the two groups is equal.
Relatively low average underpricing in the NYSE/AMEX sample o f 
conventional IPOs is consistent with the notion that IPOs listing directly on these 
exchanges are characterized by a smaller degree o f asymmetric information and 
therefore, less ex ante uncertainty about their equity value prior to an initial public 
offer. These results suggest that firms that are able to delay their IPOs, through 
private financing for example, until qualifying for direct listing on the NYSE/AMEX 
sustain less underpricing.
The proportion o f equity ownership retained by the parent of a  carved-out 
subsidiary, or owner/managers in the case o f  an IPO, is defined as the fraction of 
total shares outstanding held by the parent (owner/managers) following the initial 
public sale of equity in the new publicly traded firm. The mean (median) proportion 
retained in an equity carve-out is 68 percent (80 percent). This suggests that equity 
carve-outs are an important means for firms to raise capital and create in-house 
contracts based on market prices without losing control o f the subsidiary. For IPOs, 
the mean (median) retention rate is 54 percent (59 percent).
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Table 6 provides the distribution o f restructuring and initial public offering 
announcements by year. It is important to note that all the samples used in this study 
are more recent than those used in previous studies and there is very little overlap 
between them. The distribution for equity carve-outs indicates that these 
announcements are more common in the mid to late 1980’s. A similar pattern is 
observed for spin-off announcements. Because the IPO sample begins in 1983 it 
appears to have the same pattern. Due to the pre-1983 listing restriction o f the 
NYSE, the announcement pattern of IPOs prior to 1983 is probably similar to those of 
carve-outs and spin-off. Sell-off announcements appear to be evenly distributed 
through out the 1980’s.
Table 7 provides a distribution o f restructuring and initial public offering 
announcements by industry classification. Most of the parent firms announcing equity 
carve-outs belong to the Food and Kindred Products (SIC =2000) and Rubber and 
Miscellaneous Plastics Products (SIC=3000) groups. The largest 4-digit SIC code 
concentration occurs in the Integrated Petroleum Refining (SIC=2910) and Primary 
Metals Industry (SIC=3300) groups, which provide three announcements each. Most 
o f the carved-out units belong to the Metal Mining (SIC =  1000) and Food and 
Kindred Products (SIC =2000) groups. Within these classifications are four carved- 
out units operating in the Gold Mining (SIC =  1041) industry and four carved-out units 
in the Oil Field Services (SIC =1310) sector.
Firms announcing spin-offs are less concentrated by industry than the carve-out 
parents. The largest representation is in the Primary Metals Industry (SIC=3000).
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1979 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
1980 0 0 1 2 4 5 0
1981 1 2 2 2 20 26 0
1982 0 0 3 4 16 19 0
1983 1 1 0 0 14 18 9
1984 0 0 2 3 11 16 6
1985 2 2 3 3 18 21 7
1986 4 5 1 2 19 18 24
1987 6 7 5 5 18 17 18
1988 4 3 4 4 19 22 8
1989 2 3 8 8 12 15 0
1990 2 2 3 2 6 7 0
1991 0 0 0 0 22 19 0
Total 22 25 34 37 179 203 72
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Table 7


















1000 2 10 3 6 7 27 3
2000 9 7 5 6 58 71 16
3000 7 3 8 14 36 44 23
4000 0 1 3 5 23 27 5
5000 2 3 4 3 7 21 15
6000 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
7000 0 0 5 2 5 9 7
8000 0 0 2 1 2 4 2
9000 2 0 3 0 40 0 0
Total 22 25 34 37 179 203 72
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However, none o f the eight firms in this classification share the same 4-digit SIC 
code. Only one 4-digit classification contains more than one event, that is 9980 which 
is the code for conglomerate firms. The activities o f the parent firms involved in sell- 
offs are eclectic. The highest concentration of parent firms is found in the Food and 
Kindred Products sector (SIC=2000). The second highest concentration, S IC =9000, 
is represented by 40 conglomerate firms. The sold-off units have a similar pattern. 
Seventy-one of these subsidiaries/divisions operate in Food and Kindred Products 
industries. Fourty-four o f the units are found in the Rubber and Miscellaneous 
Plastics (SIC=3000) sector.




This chapter reports share-price responses to restructuring decisions. Section 2 
reports the effects o f equity carve-out announcements on firms announcing the carve- 
out, its rivals, and the rivals o f the carved-out subsidiary. Significantly negative 
reactions are reported for carve-out rivals which are consistent with both the 
asymmetric information and efficiency hypotheses and therefore do not differentiate 
between these different motivations related to carve-out decisions. Section 3 reports 
evidence on the announcement effects for rivals of firms going public. There are 
negative returns to this set o f rival firms which are consistent with those found for 
rivals of equity carve-outs, providing support for the asymmetric information 
hypothesis. The empirical results associated with spin-off announcements are found in 
section 4. There are positive intra-industry effects for units to be spun-off which are 
consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, but contradict efficiency 
explanations as a motivation for restructuring. Section 5 reports the impact o f sell-off 
announcements. The results o f these tests show no significant intra-industry effects 
for rivals of either the announcing firm or the sold-off unit, perhaps reflecting the 
private nature of the transaction. However, an examination o f general restructuring 
announcements indicates that a managerial decision to concentrate on a core set o f
99
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activities conveys favorable information about the future of these industries since rival 
returns to these announcements are positive. The final section contains a  summary.
2. Equity carve-outs
Table 8 contains empirical results for parents o f equity carve-outs, portfolios 
o f the intra-industry rivals o f announcing firms, and portfolios o f rivals o f the carved- 
out subsidiary. The average two-day excess return for parent firms, reported in 
column (1), is 1.70% with a t-statistic o f 2.53, significant at the 5% level. Seventy- 
seven percent of the firms have positive stock-price reactions. There is no positive 
price run-up for the parent firm prior to the announcement and post-event returns are 
also normal. These results are comparable to the findings o f Schipper and Smith 
[1986], who report a five-day excess return o f 1.83% with a  t-statistic o f 2.55 for a 
sample o f 76 equity carve-outs for the period 1965-1983. However, the median size 
of proceeds from this sample is $101 million versus $20-$30 million for the Schipper 
and Smith sample, indicating that the carve-outs in this sample are larger equity 
offerings.
The two-day average excess return to rivals of the carved-out subsidiary is - 
1.05% which is statistically significant at the 5% level, column (3). The pre-event 
and post-event returns for the industry portfolios are normal. Furthermore, 64% of 
the rival portfolios have negative announcement returns. Thus, the equity o f firms 
whose assets are employed in the same industry as the carved-out unit is revalued 
downward in response to the carve-out announcement. This result is consistent with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
Table 8
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing equity 
carve-outs, carve-out parent rivals grouped by portfolio, and carve-out rivals grouped 
by portfolio.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 






22 events 21 events 25 events
172 rivals 145 rivals
Two-day event 1.70“ .39 -1.05“
return (0,1) (2.53) (.50) (-2.35)
Proportion of [-77] [.43] [-36]
returns >  0
Pre-event -3.07 .01 .00
interval (-.42) (.00) (.00)
(-121,-1)
Post-event .45 .15 -.12







t v j i — — i , u  . . . j '■
-15.57 to 15.22 -2.19 to 8.06 -7.86 to 4.34
’Significant at the 10% level. 
“ Significant at the 5%  level. 
‘“ Significant at the 1 % level.
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N anda’s carve-out model and implies that equity carve-outs are interpreted as a signal 
that management regards the carved-out assets as overvalued. Alternatively, negative 
returns to rivals may reflect expected improvements in the efficiency o f the carved-out 
unit that reduce cash flows to rival firms. The aggregate loss o f shareholder wealth 
for industry rivals, calculated as the sum o f the two-day returns multiplied by the 
market value o f equity o f each firm, is $2.5 billion. This is 39% o f the aggregate 
gross proceeds received by the firms announcing the carve-outs.
Returns to intra-industry rivals o f parent firms announcing carve-outs are 
reported in column (2). The returns for the two-day event window are 0.39% and not 
statistically significant. Moreover, only 43 % of the portfolios experience positive 
announcement reactions. Thus, market values of rivals of parent firms are not 
affected by the carve-out announcement. The pre-event and post-event interval 
returns also are normal.
Overall, these results provide evidence supporting the information hypothesis 
as an explanation for equity carve-outs. Returns to parent firms are positive and 
significant, as reported in earlier studies. Announcement returns to rivals o f carved- 
out subsidiaries are negative and significant. This suggests that negative news is 
released by the carve-out announcement and that some elements o f this information 
are industry-common, not solely firm-specific. This result is consistent with the 
M yers and Majluf-type model o f Nanda which implies that an equity carve-out is a 
negative signal o f managerial expectations about future cash flows o f the carved-out 
unit.
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Normal returns to parent rival portfolios indicate that an equity carve-out 
announcement contains little industry-common information with respect to the 
activities o f the parent’s business. This provides little support for Nanda’s 
asymmetric information model that implies that an equity carve-out conveys favorable 
news about the value o f the parent firm. It is also possible that the breadth of 
activities o f parent operations is too extensive to generate an accurate matching of 
industry related activities based on SIC codes, thus weakening the power o f  the test 
relative to the case o f the carved-out units, which are more narrowly focused 
economic entities.
These results can also be viewed as providing support for the efficiency 
hypothesis. Carving-out a  subsidiary may create important efficiency gains for the 
carved-out subsidiary. Increased efficiency implies that the subsidiary will be more 
competitive in its markets which should have an adverse impact on intra-industry 
rivals. The negative returns to the rivals o f the subsidiaries support this argument.
The size o f the returns to portfolios o f rivals o f the subsidiary are small relative to the 
gains to parent firms. I f  efficiency considerations are the sole source for this result, 
such gains should be approximately equal. Thus, although the evidence from equity 
carve-outs provides support for both the asymmetric information hypothesis and the 
efficiency hypothesis, the size o f the announcement losses to subsidiary rivals make it 
unlikely that the sole factor is efficiency gains. To gain further insight on the issue, 
intra-industry effects on IPOs can be analyzed.
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3. IPOs
Table 9 contains the empirical results for 72 equally-weighted portfolios of 
rival firms in response to the announcement of an IPO within the industry. The 
average two-day excess return for the rival portfolios is -.88% with a t-statistic of - 
3.06, which is significant at the 1% level. Thus, although IPOs are small relative to 
the market value o f other firms in their industry, the intra-industry effects are 
comparable to returns observed in response to equity carve-outs. Approximately 74% 
of the portfolios o f IPO rivals have negative returns. The calculated aggregate decline 
in shareholder wealth for industry rivals is $1.8 billion, which is 56% of the 
aggregate total proceeds received by the offering firms. This evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that announcements o f conventional IPOs convey some 
unfavorable industry-common information about asset values and/or future cash flows. 
The fact that relatively small IPOs generate such strong effects casts doubt on the 
relevance o f efficiency arguments based on enhanced compensation contracts as a 
rationale for such announcement effects. In addition, there is little previous evidence 
suggesting that economic efficiency considerations are a primary motivation in IPO 
decisions.
The negative industry effects for carve-outs and IPOs are approximately equal. 
A difference in means test between returns for the two groups generates a calculated t- 
value of .24 which indicates that returns to rivals of IPOs and rivals of equity carve- 
outs are not significantly different. Thus, the significantly negative APEs to industry
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Table 9
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for rival portfolios o f firms announcing an 
initial public offering o f equity to be traded on the NYSE/AMEX.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 






Two-day event return (0,1) -1.07***
(-3.67)
Proportion o f returns >  0 .24
Pre-event interval (-121,-1) -.05
(-.02)
Post-event interval (2,15) .01
(.01)
M edian portfolio return -1.04
Range o f returns -7.11 to 5.42
Significant at the 1 % level.
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rivals of IPOs and carve-outs is consistent with the hypothesis that equity issues do 
convey unfavorable information about asset values and/or future cash flows.
4. Spin-offs
Table 10 contains empirical results for firms announcing spin-offs, their intra­
industry rivals, and the rivals of the spun-off subsidiaries. The two-day APE for 
announcing firms is 1.33% with a t-statistic o f 2.32, as reported in column (1). 
Approximately 73% o f  these firms have positive two-day announcement returns. The 
pre-event and post-event returns are normal. Schipper and Smith [1983], Hite and 
Owers [1983], and Miles and Rosenfeld [1983] report two-day announcement returns 
o f  2.84% , 3.30%, and 3.34% respectively. The similarity of these results with those 
o f  previous spin-off studies indicates that this sample of spin-offs is also representative 
o f  these earlier samples.
In column (3) the average announcement period return for the portfolios of 
rivals of spun-off units is a positive 0.68% , which is significant at the 10% level (t- 
statistic =  1.86). Moreover, approximately 60% o f the portfolio returns are positive. 
There are normal returns in both the pre-event or post-event intervals. The positive 
return to rivals o f spun-off units stands in contrast to the negative returns to rivals of 
carved-out units and IPOs. Applying a difference in means to the two-day returns for 
rival portfolios o f carve-outs and spin-offs yields a calculated t-value o f 2.76, 
rejecting the null hypothesis o f equality at the 1 % level. Likewise, a difference in 
means test indicates that returns to rivals o f IPOs are significantly different from the
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Table 10
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing spin-offs, 
spin-off parent rivals grouped by portfolio, and spin-off rivals grouped by portfolio.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum of excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 











Two-day event 1.33" .28 .68*
return (0,1) (2.32) (.72) (1.86)
Proportion o f 
returns >  0
[-73] [-52] [-60]












Range o f returns -8.26 to -1.93 to -4.21 to
9.48 2.24 6.66
'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
" ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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returns to rivals o f spun-off subsidiaries (t= 3 .45). This evidence, combined with the 
evidence from equity carve-outs, presents support for the hypothesis that equity issues 
do convey unfavorable information about asset values and/or future cash flows.
The pattern o f these results supports the asymmetric information hypothesis. 
The positive stock-price reaction to spin-off announcements indicates that this method 
of separating a subsidiary from the parent is viewed as a  signal o f favorable 
information with industry-common elements. M ore specifically, a spin-off allows a 
parent to separate a subsidiary while simultaneously signaling management’s 
reluctance to issue equity in either the parent or the spun-off subsidiary, or to sell the 
subsidiary to a third party. In contrast, the results are inconsistent with the efficiency 
hypothesis which predicts negative valuation effects for intra-industry rivals o f spun- 
off units. If  a firm restructures via a spin-off so as to induce a subsidiary to become 
more efficient and more competitive, such announcements should have negative 
effects for rivals o f the spun-off firms. The positive returns to spin-offs, however, do 
not support this prediction and contrast with the negative rival returns to carve-outs. 
This suggests that the negative effects observed for rivals o f carved-out subsidiaries 
reflect the market’s concern about a potential redistribution o f wealth from outside 
investors to parent-company shareholders, an effect associated with the issuance of 
equity that is not possible in a spin-off.
The returns to portfolios of parent firm rivals are positive but not statistically 
significant, a result that closely parallels results for rivals o f parents o f equity carve- 
outs. The absence o f a significant return may reflect the lack of an information effect
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or the fact that the breadth o f operations o f parent firms prevents effective matching 
o f rival firms. Overall, the evidence indicates that a spin-off or an equity carve-out 
decision communicates little information about the value of the industry the parent 
firm operates in.
5. Sell-offs
Table 11 contains general event study results for sell-off events. In column (1) 
the returns to parent firms announcing a sell-off are a positive 1.69%, which is 
strongly significant given a t-statistic of 8.55. Approximately 55% of the returns are 
positive. These results closely parallel those reported for parents of spin-offs and 
carve-outs and are consistent with results found in previous sell-off studies. For 
example, Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] find a significant positive return of 1.66% 
for a sample o f 53 sell-offs completed during the period 1963-1981. In the 6 months 
prior to a sell-off announcement, firms gain an average 5.01% , significant at the 1% 
level. This implies that firms involved in sell-offs are not in distress which 
contradicts the Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz finding, which is based on a smaller sample 
o f only firms filing 8-k reports.
The positive and significant returns to firms announcing a sell-off are 
consistent with both the asymmetric information and efficiency hypotheses of 
restructuring. To provide further insight on motivations for sell-offs, intra-industry 
returns to these announcements are obtained. In column (2) rivals o f parent firms 
have an average announcement return of 0.03% , which is not statistically significant.
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Table 11
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing sell-offs, 
sell-off parent rivals grouped by portfolio, and sell-off rivals grouped by portfolio.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum of excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 











Two-day return 1.70” * .03 .04
(-1,0) (8.55) (.25) (.24)
Proportion o f 
returns >  0
[.62] [.49] [.49]












Range o f -16.68 to -4.73 -7.62 to
returns 42.34 to 4.17 10.87
’Significant at the 10% level. 
’’Significant at the 5% level. 
’’’Significant at the 1% level.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
M oreover, 49% o f the portfolios have positive returns. These portfolios also earn 
normal returns in both the pre-event and post-event interval. The statistically 
insignificant returns to parent rivals may indicate that no private information is 
conveyed or that there are no efficiency effects on industry rivals. Normal returns 
may also be the result o f the private nature o f the sell-off transaction, counteracting 
negative information effects o f raising external funds.
In contrast to spin-offs and carve-outs, portfolios o f rivals o f sold-off 
subsidiaries show no abnormal returns around sell-off announcements. In column (3) 
the average return to these rivals is 0.04% , with a t-statistic o f .24. A difference in 
means test between the returns to rivals o f sold-off units and rivals o f carved-out units 
yields a calculated t-value of 1.93, rejecting the null hypothesis o f equality at the 10% 
level. This is consistent with the securities issuance view that, because a sell-off 
provides external funds for the firm without having to issue equity claims against the 
unit, the information conveyed by the sell-off should be more favorable than that 
conveyed in a carve-out.
M iller and Rock’s [1985] model o f security issuance implies that any external 
funding decision by managers conveys unfavorable information with respect to the 
firm ’s future cash flows or investment prospects. This implication is supported by the 
higher mean returns to rivals o f  spun-off units (.68%) versus rivals o f sold-off units 
(.04% ). A difference in means test between the returns for the two rival groups 
obtains a t-value of 1.89, which is statistically significant at the 10% level.
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The evidence from sell-offs indicates that this method o f  divestment does not 
lead to revaluation of assets throughout the industry o f the sold-off unit. This may be 
due to the fact that the private nature o f the sell-off transaction may counteract any 
negative information that is released by the firm ’s use o f a  sell-off to raise funds. 
Alternatively, the normal returns to rivals may suggest that any efficiency gains to be 
achieved by the buyer of the unit are not sufficiently large to materially change the 
competitive structure o f the industry to which the sold-off unit belongs.
5.1. Buyers of the sold-off assets
Hite, Owers, and Rogers [1987] report positive and significant returns o f .83% 
to 51 buyers o f asset sell-offs that are completed (t-statistic =  2.25) between 1963- 
1978. In contrast, the returns to 110 buyers in this sample (Table 12, column (1)) are 
negative and statistically significant with a  mean excess return o f -.71% and a  t- 
statistic o f -2.99. Almost 60% o f the sample firms experience a negative 
announcement return. The pre-event and post-event interval returns are normal.
Hite, Owers, and Rogers interpret the positive returns to sellers and buyers in 
their sample as support for the efficiency hypothesis. Because assets are being moved 
to higher valued uses both the buyer and the seller stand to gain from the transaction. 
However, the negative returns to buyers in this sample are not consistent with this 
interpretation.
There are several sample differences that may account for the difference in 
announcement reactions o f Hite, Owers, and Rogers’ buyer sample and this buyer
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Table 12
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms purchasing assets in an 
announced sell-off transaction.
The returns for the entire sample are found in column (1). Returns to buyers who are 
identified in the initial sale announcement are reported in column (2). Column (3) 
contains the returns to buyers who are identified subsequent to the initial 
announcement o f the asset sale. For the latter group, day 0 is date o f the Wall Street 
Journal article associating the purchaser with the previously announced asset sale.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum of excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion of positive returns are in brackets.
Sell-off announcement
(1) (2) (3)
Buyers named in Buyers named
initial sale following initial
All buyers announcement sale announcement
110 events 79 events 32 events
Two-day return -.71“ * -.65" -.82“
(-1,0) (-2.99) (-2.19) (-2.11)
Proportion of [-41] [.41] [-40]
returns >  0
Pre-event interval -1.47 -1.19 -2.16
(-121,-2) (-.79) (-.51) (-.72)
Post-event interval .83 .90 .66
(1,15) (1.27) (1.00) (.62)
Median return -.32 -.63 -.80
Range o f Returns -24.04 to -24.04 to -8.99 to
12.22 12.22 4.31
'Significant at the 10% level. 
“ Significant at the 5%  level. 
‘“ Significant at the 1 % level.
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sample. First, the average asset sale by Hite, Owers, and Rogers is relatively small, 
with a median value of $42 million. In contrast, the median sell-off in this sample is 
$507.1 million. Thus, bidder returns for larger sell-offs could more closely resemble 
the negative returns in some studies o f acquisitions o f entire firms. Second, the 
sample period o f this study is 1980-1991. In contrast, Hite, Owers, and Rogers’ 
sample period for buyers is 1963-1978. There is evidence o f an apparent negative 
shift in the returns to bidders in merger and acquisition transactions in the 1980’s 
which may also be typical of returns to buyers of sold-off assets during the same 
periods.
In particular, the negative returns to buyers of sold-off assets are comparable 
to the average negative returns found for firms making tender offers during the 1980’s 
reported by Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter [1988] and Bradley, Desai and Kim [1988]. 
Consistent with these results, You, Caves, Smith and Henry [1986] show that the 
distribution o f returns to bidders in mergers and acquisitions (1975 to 1984) has a 
mean of -1 %, and 53% of the returns are negative. The negative returns to bidder 
firms are attributed to increased governmental regulation and more effective takeover 
defenses. However, it is not apparent that these explanations apply to sell-offs. 
Regulatory influence is not an obvious factor in any of these sell-off transactions, and 
there is no need to overcome takeover defense tactics - these asset sales are all 
negotiated and represent a voluntary decision by the selling firm. Thus, while the 
apparent pattern o f positive returns in the 1960’s and 1970’s and negative returns in 
the 1980’s to buyers of sold-off assets parallels that of returns to bidders in
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acquisitions, some explanations for the latter paradigm are not applicable to the 
former. Further testing fails to produce a definitive, satisfactory explanation for the 
significantly average negative returns to the buyers in sell-off transactions, suggesting 
that sell-off purchasers may be characterized by hubris behavior as described by Roll 
[1986]. These tests are explained in the discussion that follows.
To gain further insight on the pattern o f returns to buyers, separate returns are 
calculated for buyers who are identified in the initial sale announcement versus those 
who are identified in a subsequent announcement, reported in columns (2) and (3) o f 
Table 12 respectively. The results o f this breakdown suggest that regardless o f when 
the buyer is announced, the returns to the transaction announcement are, on average, 
significantly negative. For buyers named in the initial announcement, the returns are 
-.65% ( t= -2 .19). For buyers named in a subsequent announcement, the A PE is - 
.82% (t= -2 .11 ). Tables 13 and 14 report the related returns to the seller, rivals o f 
the seller, and rivals o f the sold-off unit when the buyer is identified in the initial 
announcement versus in a subsequent announcement. The returns to the sellers in 
each group are positive and strongly significant, indicating that the timing of 
identification of a buyer has little impact on the announcement reaction to the selling 
firms. The returns to parent rival portfolios and sold-off unit rival portfolios are 
unaffected by the timing o f disclosure of the buyer. None of the parent or unit rival 
portfolios experience abnormal announcement returns.
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Table 13
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing an asset(s) 
sale, their intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the unit being sold, and the purchaser of 
the asset(s).
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.



















Two-day 1.63"* .08 .05 -.6 5 "
return
(-1,0)
(6.95) (.55) (.30) (-2.19)
Proportion of 
returns >  0
[.58] [-49] [-51] [-41]
Pre-event 5 .4 2 " ’ -.00 .01 -1.19
interval
(-121,-2)
(3.00) (-.00) (-01) (-.51)
Post-event -.10 -.01 .04 .90
interval
(1,15)




.45 -.05 .02 -.63
Range of -12.31 to -4.73 to -7.62 to -24.04 to
returns 31.44 10.87 4.85 12.22
'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
’"Significant at the 1 % level.
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Table 14
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing an asset(s) 
sale, their intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the unit being sold, and the purchaser of 
the asset(s). These sales were initially announced without identifying the purchaser of 
the asset(s).
Cumulative excess returns are the sum of excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion of positive returns are in brackets.



























- .8 2 "
(-2-11)
Proportion of 
returns >  0





































"Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
" ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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5.2. Sell-offs and the potential for collusion
Because a sell-off may decrease the number o f independent producers of a 
product, the equity value of buying firms and rival firms may be affected by an 
increased potential for collusion due to a more restricted oligopoly. Therefore, the 
purchase of a sold-off subsidiary by another industry member may create an increase 
in market power and profits within the industry. In this case, the predicted returns 
for buyers, sellers, and intra-industry rivals are each positive, reflecting the potential 
increases in market power and profitability. This hypothesis is tested by dividing the 
entire group of sell-offs between those where the buyer is in the same industry as the 
sold-off unit, i.e. a horizontal sell-off, and those where the buyer is not.
The empirical results for the horizontal sell-off groups are reported in Table
15. The sellers (column (1)) experience a positive and statistically significant mean 
return o f 1.19% (t-statistic =  4.42). Returns to the portfolios of parent rivals and 
unit rivals are .02% and .09%, respectively, and are not statistically significant. The 
mean return to the buyer group is -.51% , which is not statistically significant at the 
5% level (t= -1 .81)
The empirical results for the non-horizontal group of buyers are found in Table
16. Sell-off parents experience a positive mean return o f 2.30% , significant at the 
1% level (t= 9 .4 2 ), which exceeds the return to firms that sell to buyers belonging to 
the same industry as the sold-off unit. Again, the returns to the rival portfolios o f the 
parents and sold-off units are normal (.04 and -.03 respectively). The buyers, who
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Table 15
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AM EX firms announcing a 
horizontal sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the 
purchaser o f the unit. A horizontal sell-off is defined as the purchaser and the sold- 
o ff unit sharing the same 4-digit SIC code.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 





















Two-day 1.19*“ .03 .09 -.51*
Returns
(-1,0)




(.63] [-51] [-48] [.39]
Pre-event 3.50* .00 -.01 -1.28
interval
(-121,-2)
(1.68) (.00) (-.00) (-.58)
Post-event .85 .02 .03 .59
interval
(1,15)




.76 .01 -.17 -.75
Range o f -12.31 to -4.73 to -7.62 to -10.68 to
returns 15.11 4.17 10.87 12.22
‘Significant at the 10% level. 
“ Significant at the 5 % level. 
“ ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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Table 16
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing a non­
horizontal sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals of the sold-off unit, and the 
purchaser o f the unit. A non-horizontal sell-off is defined as the purchaser and the 
sold-off unit having different 4-digit SIC codes.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 





















Two-day 2.30"* .04 -.03 -1.13***
Returns
(-1,0)




[-60] [-46] [-51] [-48]
Pre-event 6.79"* .02 .02 -1.89
interval
(-121,-2)
(3.72) (.01) (.01) (-.60)
Post-event -.14 -.02 .03 1.35
interval
(1,15)




.60 -.09 -.03 -.25
Range of -16.68 to -2.07 to -3.86 to -24.01 to
returns 42.34 2.96 4.85 5.74
'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
‘"Significant at the 1 % level.
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are entering the industry through the purchase of the sold-off subsidiary, experience a 
negative and significant return o f -1.13% (t=-2.75).
W hile it appears that horizontal sales redistribute some o f the gains associated 
with asset sale transactions from the sellers to the buyers, difference in means tests 
indicate that the returns to the horizontal sellers (buyers) and non-horizontal sellers 
(buyers) are not significantly different from each other. A difference in means test 
between the returns to horizontal sellers (buyers) and non-horizontal sellers (buyers) 
generates a t-statistic of 1.22 (.75). These results, combined with the normal returns 
to unit rival portfolios, provide no support for the possibility that sell-offs within an 
industry systematically create a collusive environment.
5.3. Sell-offs involving multiple bidders
It is possible that the auction environment could be responsible for the negative 
returns to buyers. In particular, the presence o f a multiple bid auction for an asset 
may alter returns by increasing the seller’s return and reducing the returns to bidders. 
In this way, multiple bids may lead to a negative return to buyers through the 
"winner’s curse". Roll [1986] offers the winner’s curse as an explanation for 
overpayment in mergers generally, and results for buyers in asset acquisitions could 
reflect a similar effect.
The impact of an auction environment on the equity values of sellers and 
buyers is analyzed by obtaining the returns associated with sell-offs that have multiple 
bidders. Column (1) of Table 17 contains the returns to sellers who utilized an
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Table 17
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing an asset(s) 
sale associated with multiple bids for the asset(s), intra-industry rivals, the rivals of 
the unit being sold, and the purchaser o f the asset(s).
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.



















Two-day .67 -.34 .23 -.54
return
(-1,0)
(.89) (-1.14) (.53) (-.82)
Proportion of 
returns >  0
[-67] [-41] [-27] [.30]
Pre-event -1.25 -.02 -.07 -5.51
interval
(-121,-2)
(-.21) (-.01) (-.02) (-1.09)
Post-event 2.35 .01 .00 .51
interval
(1,15)




.76 -.24 -.84 -1.37
Range o f -7.91 to -3.42 to -4.00 to -2.49 to
returns 6.40 2.73 5.74 5.06
'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5% level. 
" ’Significant at the 1 % level.
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auction format for their asset sale. The returns to this relatively small group o f  19 
events upon announcing the auction are positive (.67% ) but not significant. The 
average return to the announcement o f the winning bidder, -.54% , is not statistically 
different from zero. Thus, the mean returns to each group are smaller than the mean 
returns for the overall seller sample and not statistically significant. The lack o f 
significance may reflect the small sample size (n =  19), but it is clear that the negative 
returns to buyers as a  whole cannot be explained by returns associated with multiple 
bid auctions. Equity values of sell-off parent rivals and sold-off unit rivals appear to 
be unaffected by multiple bid asset sales.
5.4. Type of proceeds from the sale
Studies by Gordon and Yagil [1981], Wansley, Lane, and Yang [1983], and 
Travlos [1985, 1987] find higher abnormal returns to target firms for cash offers than 
for stock offers in merger and acquisition transactions. These studies also reveal 
negative and significant announcement returns (-1.47%) to bidders offering equity as a 
method o f payment, while bidders offering cash experience normal announcement 
returns. The negative returns in merger and acquisition transactions are consistent 
with the implications o f the Myers and M ajluf [1984] model o f securities issuance; 
that is, managers issue equity in their own firm when they feel the equity is 
overvalued by the market. This argument is tested for sell-off transactions to see if 
the means o f payment is responsible for the presence o f negative returns to buyers.
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Table 18 (column (1)) contains the returns to relevant groups where sales 
proceeds consist o f cash and other non-equity forms o f payment for the sold-off 
asset(s). Returns to announcements o f sell-offs where the medium o f exchange 
involves equity are found in Table 19. The buyers offering non-equity forms of 
payment experience significant negative announcement returns o f -.65% with a t- 
statistic of -2.67. Pre-event and post-event returns are normal for these firms. The 
relatively small number o f buyers (n =  13) offering equity as a form o f  payment for 
acquired assets experience normal announcement returns (-.87% , t= -1 .0 2 ), pre-event 
returns (-7.50%, t = - l . 15) and post-event returns (3.15%, t = 1.37). A difference in 
means test between the returns for the two buyer groups generates a t-value o f .46 (p- 
value =  .65), indicating failure to reject the null hypothesis that the mean returns are 
equal.
Announcement returns to selling firms receiving cash and other non-equity 
forms of compensation from an asset sale are 1.62% and strongly significant 
(t= 7 .92 ). The selling firms have a significant positive return of 5.61%  (t= 3 .55 ) in 
the pre-event interval and normal returns of .35% in the post-event interval. For sell- 
off parents (n=14) receiving equity in exchange for assets announcement returns 
(.95% , t = 1.36), pre-event returns (1.01%, t= .1 9 ) , and post-event returns (1.53%, 
t = .  80) are all normal. A difference in means test between these two seller groups 
also fails to reject the null hypothesis that the mean returns are different from each 
other (t-value =  .56). Whether an asset sale involves equity as a  medium of
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Table 18
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms receiving cash and 
other non-equity forms o f compensation as proceeds from a  sell-off. Also included 
are cumulative excess returns for intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, 
and the purchaser o f the unit.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.




















Two-day 1.62” * .00 .07 -.65*"
Returns
(-1,0)
(7.92) (.02) (.45) (-2.67)
Proportion 
o f returns 
>  0
[.61] [.49] [.49] [•40]
Pre-event 5.61” * .02 .00 -.38
interval
(-121,-2)
(3.55) (.02) (■00) (-.20)
Post-event .35 -.00 .05 .50
interval
(1,15)




.67 -.05 -.03 -.81
Range of -16.68 to -4.73 to -7.62 to -10.68 to
returns 42.34 3.78 10.87 10.36
'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
" ’Significant at the 1 % level.
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Table 19
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms receiving a 
combination o f cash, equity, and notes as proceeds from a sell-off. Also included are 
cumulative excess returns for intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and 
the purchaser of the unit.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.



















Two-day .95 .23 -.22 -.87
return
(-1,0)
(1.36) (.48) (-.33) (-1.02)
Proportion o f 
returns >  0
[.57] [.46] [.50] [.52]
Pre-event 1.01 -.10 .04 -7.50
interval
(-121,-2)
(.19) (-.03) (.01) (-1.15)
Post-event 1.53 .11 -.10 3.15
interval
(1,15)




1.45 -.11 2.03 .59
Range of -7.36 to -1.42 to -24.04 to -6.91 to
returns 9.55 4.17 12.22 14.85
'Significant at the 10% level. 
“ Significant at the 5 % level. 
“ ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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exchange or not, rivals o f the selling firm as well as those o f the sold-off unit 
experience normal announcement, pre-event, and post-event returns.
Thus, the empirical results on the type o f proceeds offered as payment for 
sold-off assets do not parallel those for merger and acquisition transactions. M ore 
specifically, there is no evidence that returns to buyers offering equity to sellers are 
lower than for buyers who offer cash and debt securities as a  means of payment.
Thus, negative returns to buyers of asset sales are not the result o f  equity issuance by 
buyers.
5.5. Sell-offs by distressed firms
Distressed asset sales are defined as sell-offs by firms currently in 
reorganization under Chapter 11 (n= 4 ), in private workouts (n= 5), or those that have 
omitted a dividend in the 12 months prior to the sale (n = 9 ). Returns to two firms in 
bankruptcy, one firm in a private workout, and one firm  that had omitted dividends 
are not available and therefore these firms are deleted from the sample o f selling 
firms. However, rival portfolios for all four o f these parent firms are available and 
included in the analysis.
Generally the announcement of these sales is likely to indicate that the firm is 
under pressure to divest the assets swiftly in order to raise funds to repay debt 
obligations or otherwise meet cash needs. Proceeds from these sales are typically 
cash, and the transactions tend to be brought to fruition quickly. Due to the pressure 
to sell, the seller may not have time or be able to negotiate the appropriate price for
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the assets, especially since its state o f distress and need for capital are public 
information. Therefore, potential bidders may be able to purchase the assets at a 
price below the market’s expectation of the value o f the assets to the seller. In this 
case the average returns to sellers in distress may be lower than the average return to 
sellers who are not in distress. Likewise, the average returns to the purchasers of 
assets sold by a distressed firm may be higher than the average returns to purchasers 
o f assets sold by non-distressed firms. In this regard, James and W eir [1987] report 
significantly positive returns to bidders that acquire banks that have been seized by 
regulatory authorities.
Empirical results to announcements of sell-offs by firms in distress are 
reported in Table 20. The returns to sellers are positive (.99% ) but not significant 
( t = .94). Buyers experience a positive and significant average return o f 1.80% with a 
t-statistic o f 2.77. In contrast, empirical results to non-distressed sales, reported in 
Table 21, indicate that returns to sellers and buyers parallel those found for the entire 
sample. The APE for non-distressed sellers is 1.76% with a corresponding t-statistic 
o f 8.99, indicating significance at the 1% level. The APE for buyers in non- 
distressed sales is -1.08% (t= -4 .47 ), also significant at the 1% level. M oreover, a 
difference in means test generates a calculated t-value o f 2.32 (p-value =  .02) 
indicating that the APE’s for the two buyer groups are statistically different from each 
other at the 5% level. A difference in means test for the two seller groups produces a 
t-value of .35 (p-value =  .75) and fails to reject the null hypothesis that the means 
returns to the two groups are equal. Although these results should be interpreted with
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Table 20
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for distressed NYSE/AMEX firms announcing 
a sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the purchaser o f the 
unit. A distressed sell-off is defined as a sell-off by a  firm in Chapter 11 or by a firm 
that omitted a dividend during the 12 months prior to the announcement.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.




















Two-day .99 -.41 -.43 1.80” *
Returns
(-1,0)
(.94) (-1.23) (-.67) (2.77)
Proportion 
o f returns 
>  0
[.71] [-39] [-40] [-69]
Pre-event -3.42 -.00 .01 2.77
interval
(-121,-2)
(-.41) (-.00) (.00) (.55)
Post-event 4.63 -.05 -.13 .36
interval
(1,15)




.91 -.24 -.65 1.24
Range of -16.68 to -3.14 to -4.45 to -5.59 to
returns 17.12 3.49 3.85 10.51
'Significant at the 10% level. 
“ Significant at the 5 % level. 
“ ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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Table 21
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX non-distressed firms 
announcing a sell-off, intra-industry rivals, the rivals o f the sold-off unit, and the 
purchaser o f the unit. A non-distressed sell-off is defined as an asset sale by a firm 
that is neither in Chapter 11 or nor has omitted a dividend during the 12 months prior 
to the announcement.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum of excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
Asset sales by non-distressed parent firms
(1) (2) (3) 
Rivals o f
(4)
Sell-off Parent sold-off All
parents rivals units buyers





Two-day 1.76“ * .08 .07 -1.08***
Returns
(-1,0)
(8.99) (.63) (.48) (-4.41)
Proportion 
o f returns 
>  0
[•61] [-50] [.50] [.37]
Pre-event 5.77” * .01 .00 -2.09
interval
(-121,-2)
(3.86) (.01) (.00) (-1.08)
Post-event .03 .01 .05 .91
interval
(1,15)




.63 -.01 .00 -1.02
Range of -12.31 to -4.73 to -7.62 to -24.04 to
returns 42.34 4.17 10.87 12.22
'Significant at the 10% level. 
“ Significant at the 5 % level. 
' “ Significant at the 1 % level.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
131
caution due to the small sample size o f distressed sales (n = 1 4 ), the pattern o f returns 
is consistent with the notion that distressed sales cause a redistribution o f the overall 
gains from a sell-off away from the seller. The results also strengthen the conclusion 
that returns to buyers o f sold-off assets that are not associated with distressed sellers 
are strongly negative.
5.6. Retention and uses of proceeds from sell-offs
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz [1992] report positive and significant returns to sell- 
off announcements for firms that use the proceeds from a sell-off to repay debt. No 
firms in their sample repurchased equity. In contrast, they find normal announcement 
returns for firms who retain the proceeds. They conclude that the positive returns to 
sellers reducing their leverage can be attributed to avoidance o f economically 
significant costs o f financial distress and the avoidance of the agency costs o f free 
cash flow that pervade firms that do retain the proceeds. Their conclusions also imply 
that retaining the proceeds for any reason, even if such sales are a source of funding 
investment in areas o f firm expertise, produce normal returns to asset sales.
Table 22 contains the empirical results for selling firms and their rivals, 
disaggregated by whether the firm retains the proceeds or does not retain the proceeds 
from asset sales. Sellers retaining proceeds (column (1)) experience a positive and 
significant mean return o f 1.29% (t=5 .29). This is in contrast to the Lang, Poulsen 
and Stulz result o f normal returns to these sellers. Sellers using the proceeds to 
reduce debt, repurchase equity, or both, also experience a positive and strongly
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Table 22
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms retaining the proceeds 
from sell-offs and those not retaining the proceeds (i.e. proceeds use to reduce debt, 
repurchase equity, or both). Also included are cumulative excess returns for intra­
industry rivals o f the parents and the units for the respective samples.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Firms retaining proceeds Firms not retaining proceeds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sell-off Parent Sell-off Parent
parents rivals parents Rivals
129 events 127 events 
1139 rivals














o f returns 
>  0


























.67 -.11 2.30 .28










'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
" ’Significant at the 1 % level.
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significant announcement return of 2.77% (t= 7 .8 9 ), which is close to the figure of 
3.14% reported by Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz. Both groups o f firms in this sample 
show a  strong positive return in the six months prior to the announcement and normal 
returns in the 3 weeks subsequent to the announcement. A difference in means test 
for the announcement returns to both seller groups generates a calculated t-value o f 
1.22 (p-value =  .22). Thus, this pattern in announcement returns to asset sales is 
consistent with the findings o f Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz that firms not retaining the 
proceeds from asset sales tend to have higher average announcement returns, but 
contrary to Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, firms that retain proceeds have significantly 
positive returns.
The differences found in the results o f Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz versus this 
study may be driven by the fact that their study has a  relatively high proportion o f 
firms in some distress, whereas the sample o f large divestitures found in this study 
contains very few distressed sell-offs. More specifically, the median dollar value of 
the sell-off ($28 million) and the market value o f the selling firms ($150 million) in 
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz are small relative to the median values o f found in this study 
o f $507 million and $2.4 billion, respectively. Overall, the results in this study 
suggest that agency problems may play a role in asset sales, but even firms that retain 
proceeds generate positive returns from sell-offs. Returns to the rivals o f the sellers 
who retain proceeds and those who do not (columns (2) and (4) respectively) are 
normal in each case. This result indicates that no industry information is released
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from asset sales which supports the notion that firm specific agency problems may 
play a role in the return to sellers.
The sample o f sellers not retaining the sell-off proceeds is analyzed further to 
determine if  the form of disbursement, i.e . reducing debt or repurchasing equity, has 
an impact on the announcement returns. The results are reported in Table 23. A 
sample o f 33 firms are identified as declaring the intent to reduce debt with the sell- 
off proceeds in the initial announcement o f the sale (column (1)). Returns to these 
selling firms are positive (2.82%) and strongly significant (t= 6 .38). These firms 
experience normal returns in the pre-event and post-event intervals. Rivals o f these 
firms experience normal announcement 
(-.13% ), pre-event, and post-event returns (column (2)).
A sample o f 13 firms (column (3)) is obtained for sellers using the proceeds 
from a sell-off to repurchase equity. These firms experience a mean return of 3.14% 
with a t-statistic o f 6.34, which is significant at the 1% level. These firms have a 
strong positive pre-event return of 13.48% (t=3 .51). Post-event returns are normal 
(.80% with t= .5 9 ) . Moreover, the rival portfolios corresponding to these firms 
(column (4)) also experience a significant positive announcement return o f .81% 
(t= 2 .03 ). Significant positive returns to intra-industry rivals suggest that favorable 
private managerial information may be conveyed by these announcements about the 
future profitability o f the parent firm ’s industry, the value o f the assets in place, or an 
expected change in the risk o f the industry. These results are consistent with the 
literature on share repurchase announcements (Dann [1981], Vermalen [1981]). The
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Table 23
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for two samples of NYSE/AMEX firms 
retaining the proceeds from sell-offs; one sample used the proceeds to reduce debt 
proceeds and the other used the proceeds to repurchase equity. Also included are 
cumulative excess returns for intra-industry rivals o f the parents and the units for the 
respective samples.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The proportion o f positive returns are in brackets.
Firms reducing debt Firms repurchasing equity









33 events 41 events 
396 rivals














o f returns 
>  0


























1.33 .09 3.88 .63










’Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
‘"Significant at the 1 % level.
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positive returns to the rival firms in this sample, however, contrasts with Hertzel 
[1991], who finds no intra-industry effects for share repurchase announcements. In 
addition, it should be noted that this intra-industry effect is based on a small sample 
size (n= 8).
The overall results generally parallel the findings o f Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 
that there are greater returns to sell-offs in which proceeds are to be paid out rather 
than retained within the firm. However, they find that positive returns accrue only to 
firms announcing a sell-off and the intent to reduce debt with the proceeds. Empirical 
results from tests in this study indicate that firms that do retain proceeds also have 
positive announcement returns. This difference may be due to the fact that their 
sample includes a substantial number o f relatively small, distressed firms, whereas the 
incidence o f distressed firms in this sample o f relatively large firms is less than 10%.
5.7. The effect of general restructuring announcements
To gain further insight on the information effects o f sell-offs, empirical results 
for 38 general restructuring announcements are obtained and reported in Table 24. 
These announcements typically report a general intention to shed less profitable 
businesses and increase investment in core businesses by using the proceeds from 
divestitures. The average two-day return to these announcements is 3.22% , with a t- 
statistic o f 8.16 and 68% of the sample have positive announcement returns. The pre­
event period return is a positive and statistically significant 6.52% , and the post-event 
returns are normal. Thus, the market regards announcements in which the firm
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Table 24
Cumulative excess returns (in percent) for NYSE/AMEX firms announcing a 
restructuring and their intra-industry rivals grouped by portfolio.
Cumulative excess returns are the sum o f excess returns over relevant event periods. 
Excess returns are calculated as the difference between realized returns and expected 
returns from -240 days to -121 days prior to announcement. The t-statistics are in 






38 events 33 events
385 rivals
Two-day return 3.22"* .55"
(-1,0) (8.16) (2.12)
Proportion of [.68] [.58]
returns >  0








Range of -2.56 to -4.34
returns 15.56 to 7.73
Significant at the 10% level. 
"Significant at the 5 % level. 
" ‘Significant at the 1 % level.
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indicates a willingness to sell a broad array o f assets and focus on core businesses as 
favorable news. Moreover, for the rivals o f these firms, the average two-day return 
is 0.55% and t-statistic is 2.12 with 58% o f the returns positive. These results 
support the view that managers are optimistic about the value of the firm’s core assets 
and the market reacts to this signal by increasing the equity o f the parent firm ’s 
rivals.
An efficiency explanation for the returns for restructuring firms and their rivals 
is inconsistent with this result. The magnitude o f the average returns for restructuring 
announcements suggests that the market expects a material increase in the profitability 
of these firms. I f  this increase were expected to come at the expense of intra-industry 
rivals, the rivals would experience negative stock-price reactions. Instead, there is a 
significantly positive announcement effect for rivals which is consistent with the view 
that the industry related to the firm ’s core activities is judged to have favorable future 
prospects. Therefore, the restructuring announcement signals managerial beliefs about 
the future profitability o f the industry rather than an indication o f their greater 
comparative advantage within the industry.
These results are also inconsistent with the agency cost hypothesis.
Restructuring announcements indicate mangers are anticipating substantial cash flows 
into the firm that are to be redirected into core activities. If these cash flows were 
viewed by the market as increasing agency costs, the share price response should not 
be positive. Moreover, if  firm specific agency factors were dominant there would be 
no effect on intra-industry rivals. Instead, the market’s positive reaction to
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announcing firms and their rivals in response to restructuring announcements indicates 
that managers are viewed as making appropriate financing and investment decisions 
conducive to shareholder wealth maximization and that there are positive prospects for 
the industry as a  whole.
6. Summary
The overall empirical results reported here provide evidence consistent with the 
predictions o f the asymmetric information hypothesis o f securities issuance when 
viewed within the context of corporate restructuring decisions involving equity carve- 
outs and spin-offs, and with respect to initial public offerings. The returns also 
confirm the hypothesis that some restructuring decisions involving securities issuance 
convey elements of information relevant for valuing similar assets in related activities. 
The strongest piece of evidence for these conclusions is the announcement reactions of 
intra-industry rivals for carve-outs, IPOs and spin-offs. The returns to intra-industry 
rivals o f equity carve-outs and IPOs are significant and negative, -1.05% and -.88% , 
respectively. These results are consistent with models of security issuance which 
imply that equity issues are negative signals of managerial expectations about future 
cash flows o f relevant assets. The normal returns to sold-off unit rivals and the 
positive returns to rivals of the spun-off units are also consistent with securities 
issuance arguments. Because managers choose to undergo an economic restructuring 
without issuing equity in the parent firm or a subsidiary, the returns to these kinds of
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transactions should be better received by the market. The rival returns to spin-off 
decisions contradict the negative predictions derived from the efficiency hypothesis.
Normal returns to portfolios o f rivals o f parent firms announcing an equity 
carve-out or spin-off indicate that these announcements contain little industry-common 
information with respect to the activities o f the parent’s business. This provides little 
support for Nanda’s hypothesis that an equity carve-out conveys favorable news about 
the value o f the parent firm. It is also possible that the breadth o f activities o f parent 
operations is too extensive to generate an accurate matching o f industry related 
activities based on SIC codes, thus weakening the power o f the test relative to the 
case o f the subsidiaries.
The positive and significant returns to parent firms announcing sell-offs are 
consistent with the findings reported in earlier studies. The normal returns to parent 
and subsidiary rivals to sell-off announcements indicate that this method of divestment 
does not lead to revaluation of assets throughout the related industries. The negative 
and significant returns to buyers o f sold-off assets contrast with the positive and 
significant returns to buyers reported by Hite, Owers and Rogers [1987]. The 
differences in returns may be due to differences in the sample period, the relative size 
o f the divestitures, which tend to get larger through time, or the financial soundness 
o f the sample firms.
Because of the relatively large size o f these divestitures, and therefore the 
similarity to mergers and acquisitions, factors affecting the returns to bidders in 
control transactions are examined to determine if  similar factors apply for returns to
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buyers o f sold-off units. Empirical results indicate that: (1) the time the buyer is 
identified, whether in the initial sale announcement or in a subsequent announcement, 
has no impact on the returns to the sellers or the buyers, (2) multiple bid auctions 
cannot explain the negative returns to buyers, (3) buyers using equity as a medium of 
exchange do not experience returns statistically different from those who do not use 
equity to purchase divested units, and (4) that buyers purchasing assets from sellers in 
distress experience positive and significant returns. Distressed asset sales appear to be 
the only type o f sell-off where buyers share in the gains from the transaction.
Finally, Lang, Poulsen and Stulz argue that potential agency problems arising 
from increased free cash flow can influence the returns to firms announcing asset 
sales. They report that only firms that disburse proceeds from asset sales by reducing 
debt experience positive and significant returns. Firms retaining sale proceeds, even 
if  such proceeds are used to further investment in core business activities and areas of 
expertise, experience normal returns. In contrast, stock price reactions to sell-off 
announcements in this sample indicate that sellers who retain proceeds, as well as 
those who do not, are positive and significant. Moreover, the positive and significant 
returns to firms announcing general restructurings in order to focus on core 
businesses, and their rivals, indicate that retention of proceeds for such uses is viewed 
by the market as shareholder wealth maximizing behavior. Thus, although agency 
problems apparently play some role in asset sell-offs, it is clear that there are also 
positive wealth effects associated with increased investment in areas of the firm ’s 
expertise.
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Conclusions
The purpose o f this dissertation has been to explore the motivation behind 
various restructuring choices within a securities issuance context. Previous theoretical 
models and empirical evidence suggest that three methods o f restructuring - equity 
carve-outs, sell-offs, and spin-offs, on average, signal favorable information about 
parent firms. This has been interpreted as reflecting either enhanced potential for 
efficiency gains, positive asymmetric information about the value o f industry assets, 
o r changes in agency costs. This disseration presents an alternative framework by 
relating restructuring announcements to the effects o f security issuance. Empirical 
tests are formulated to determine if  these announcements contain valuable private 
information about the value o f a subsidiary by analyzing whether or not elements of 
this information apply to other firms involved in related activities. Similarly, if  
favorable news associated with restructuring announcements indicates that parent firm 
equity is undervalued, equity values o f intra-industry rivals may also be affected by 
restructuring decisions.
Announcements o f equity carve-outs are interpreted within Nanda’s [1991] 
M yers and Majluf-type framework. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
a motivation for these events is management’s belief that a subsidiary is likely to be 
overvalued by the market. In particular, rivals of the carved out subsidiary 
experience negative revaluation effects. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to
142
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support arguments made by Nanda [1991] that managers carve out a subsidiary 
because they believe that the parent firm ’s equity is undervalued by the market since 
rivals o f parents do not have significant positive valuation effects. Instead, rivals of 
parent firms earn normal returns.
A spin-off is a form o f divestiture that does not involve external financing. 
Rivals o f spun-off subsidiaries increase in value around these announcements. 
Management’s apparent unwillingness to sell the subsidiary in a private transaction or 
offer public equity claims on the subsidiary suggests managers believe the subsidiary’s 
asset value is greater than the proceeds these transactions would produce and that firm 
value will increase as information from the newly independent subsidiary is released. 
This type o f divestiture implies a parallel argument for the parent firm being spun off 
since managers may view their entire firm as being undervalued by the market relative 
to the value conditioned on their inside information. Nevertheless, although intra­
industry rivals o f the subsidiary experience positive stock-price reactions to the spin­
off announcement, returns to rivals of the parent, although positive, are not 
significant.
Because a sell-off can be viewed as a method o f external financing that allows 
managers to avoid an equity issue, stock price responses o f rivals o f a subsidiary to be 
sold o ff are predicted to be less negative than for a carve-out. Consistent with this 
view, rivals of assets to be sold off earn normal returns. Arguments about effects on 
rivals o f the parent firm announcing a sell-off parallel those o f equity carve-out 
decisions, except that sell-off announcements release the news that funds are to be
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raised without an equity issue, suggesting that managers believe that parent firm 
equity is not overvalued. Although sell-off announcements do not generate significant 
intra-industry effects, there are significant positive share price reactions to rivals of 
restructuring firms. This indicates that positive information is released by these 
announcements about the value o f the core assets of parents. This suggests that the 
favorable information released by these decisions pertains to managers’ favorable 
expectations about the parent firm.
The market for conventional IPOs is typically viewed as suffering from 
adverse selection problems. Potential investors view corporate insiders of privately- 
held firms as having the incentive to time a going public transaction to correspond to 
unfavorable inside information. Aware of these incentives, rational investors offer an 
appropriately low average price for IPOs. Similar to equity carve-outs, the 
announcement o f  the intent to go public releases elements o f industry-common 
information that causes downward revaluation o f intra-industry rivals o f the 
announcing firm. Together with the equity carve-out results, this evidence suggests 
that there is a negative signal content to going public. Thus, the decision to 
restructure a firm by selling equity to the public, even as an element of a corporate 
restructuring, is a negative signal about the value of the relevant industry.
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